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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines how to model the choice of individual travelers among 
various possible travel alternatives in the airline industry. A review of the 
models used to represent that choice situation in the Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator (PODS) was undertaken for two reasons. First, the 
development of computational capabilities has lead to advancements in 
consumer choice theory that enabled the implementation of more flexible models 
like mixed logit models. Second, the increasing competition of low-cost new 
entrant airlines has put great pressure on pricing practices of traditional network 
carriers. This increasing competition has also compelled these carriers to focus on 
their strengths, for example, schedule coverage. In this thesis, after a comparison 
between the PODS Passenger Choice Model and the literature on consumer 
choice theory, we will then focus on how to model passenger preference for 
schedule.  
 
The review of the literature on air traveler choice reveals that most authors have 
used discrete choice models, like standard logit or nested logit models, to 
represent the choice of individual passengers among travel alternatives. 
However, the logit model has two limitations in the air traveler choice problem: 
it can accommodate neither random taste variation in some elements of the 
passenger utility function nor the complex substitution patterns across travel 
alternatives modeled in PODS. However, we show that the highly flexible mixed 
logit model brings a solution to these limitations and the choice process modeled 
in PODS can be approximated by a set of mixed logit models.  
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In the second part of the thesis, we focus on how passenger preference for 
schedule is modeled in PODS. In the current model, a constant replanning 
disutility is added to the cost of all paths that are not convenient to the 
passenger. However, the current approach does not differentiate among paths 
based on their level of schedule inconvenience and this leads to distortions in the 
valuation of the revenue advantage of the carrier offering the best schedule. We 
propose in this thesis an alternative approach called the variable replanning 
disutility model. In this model, the replanning disutility added to the cost of 
paths depends on the time location of the path and its level of schedule 
inconvenience. PODS simulation results show that the variable replanning 
disutility model leads to a more realistic valuation of the revenue advantage 
associated with a better schedule coverage. 
 
Thesis Advisor: Dr Peter Paul Belobaba 
Title: Principal Research Scientist, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Setting, Purpose and Motivation 
 
In liberalized air transportation markets, the consumers of air 
transportation services have typically the choice between several fare class 
products on one or more available flight itineraries offered by the airlines serving 
the desired markets. Depending on their characteristics and preferences, air 
travelers will choose a particular airline, flight and fare class to fulfill their travel 
needs. Demand for air travel at the path/class level is then the result of the 
tradeoffs individual air travelers make when they choose among different 
airlines, flights and fare classes. 
 
Gaining insight about air traveler preferences and understanding the 
determinants of demand for air travel at the path/class level is important to 
support key airline planning decisions like flight scheduling, pricing, fare class 
restrictions design and seat allocation among path/classes (revenue 
management).  In that context, MIT and a consortium of seven leading airlines 
developed in the mid-nineties the Passenger Origin-Destination Simulator 
(PODS) to examine the impact of revenue management methods, especially seat 
allocation decisions at the airline network level. However, unlike most revenue 
management simulators used previously, demand for each particular path/class 
in PODS is not exogenous; it is the result of millions of individual choices at the 
air traveler level between available airlines, flight schedules and fare classes. As a 
result, what makes PODS unique among airline revenue management simulators 
is its passenger choice model that reproduces how hypothetical air travelers 
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choose among various airline, flight schedule and fare class products available in 
an air travel market. 
 
Over the years, PODS and its Passenger Choice Model have proved to be a 
valuable tool to measure the impact of various revenue management methods 
designed to maximize airline revenues at the network level. With the increase in 
computational power during the nineties, PODS has been used to simulate 
passenger choices in increasingly complex airline networks including 
transatlantic alliance networks and has produced stable and consistent results in 
the study of various revenue management issues: origin-destination revenue 
management methods, alliance revenue management, forecasting, passenger 
behavior issues like sell-up and recapture. 
 
A review of the PODS Passenger Choice Model today seems necessary for 
two main reasons. The first reason is driven by a structural change in the airline 
industry with the increasing competition from low-cost new entrant airlines. 
These new carriers along with the downturn in airline business travel since 2001 
have put a great pressure on the fare and restriction structure used by the 
traditional network carriers. As a result, PODS member airlines have shown 
great interest in using PODS to study the revenue impact of changes in their 
pricing and restriction policies. However, the PODS Passenger Choice Model has 
been primarily designed and calibrated to study the impact of revenue 
management decisions like seat allocation decisions in the context of the 
competition between several traditional network carriers offering similar fares 
and restriction structures. In order to test the impact of a new entrant airline or 
different fare/restriction structures, a review of some elements of the PODS 
passenger choice model would be useful and a recalibration of the model could 
well be necessary. 
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In addition, due to the development of low-cost competition in the United 
States and Europe in the recent years, network carriers need to focus on their 
strengths including network coverage and frequency of service. These industry 
trends have lead some consortium members to show interest into investigating 
the impact of schedule asymmetry on PODS simulation results. However, the 
PODS Passenger Choice Model has been conceived to simulate the competition 
between airlines offering similar schedules but using different revenue 
management strategies. As a result, to assess the impact of offering a superior 
schedule on airline revenues requires reviewing how passenger preference for 
schedule is modeled in PODS. 
 
The second reason is driven by progress in the theory of consumer choice. 
The development of computational capabilities in the nineties has also enabled 
significant progress in consumer choice theory, in particular in the field of 
discrete choice models. Essentially, these advancements have been mostly 
centered on the use of simulation methods, which is the researchers’ response to 
the inability of computers to perform complex integration. Simulation allows the 
estimation of otherwise intractable models: almost any model specification can 
be estimated by some form of simulation. As a result, the researcher is freed from 
previous constraints on model specification and is not limited to a few model 
specification alternatives that have favorable mathematical properties but also 
some severe limitations. Simulation allows a more creative, precise and realistic 
representation of the hugely varied choice situations that arise in the world, 
including air traveler choice among airlines, flight schedule and fare class. A new 
class of discrete choice models has emerged that offer a lot more flexibility than 
standard models used in the past. As a result, we can compare the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model and its hypotheses to these new developments in 
discrete choice models. 
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The objective of this thesis is then to review how air traveler preferences 
are modeled in PODS and relate the options used in the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model to the new competitive environment in the industry and the 
advancements in consumer choice theory. In particular, this thesis will compare 
the PODS approach to the literature and theory on air traveler choice focusing on 
discrete choice models including the new classes of flexible discrete choice 
models like mixed logit models.  In addition, due to the interest expressed by 
some consortium airline members and the potential for improvement identified 
during the passenger choice model review, this thesis will include a case study 
on how to model passenger preference for schedule in PODS.  
 
1.2. Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on consumer choice theory focusing in 
particular on discrete choice models used to describe the choice of a consumer 
among a discrete number of alternatives. This chapter includes a description of 
the most widely used discrete choice model, the logit model, its advantages and 
its limitations and some more complex and flexible models developed to 
overcome these limitations like for instance nested logit models or mixed logit 
models. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model including how it was developed based on the Boeing Decision Window 
Model. In addition, this chapter compares the approach used in the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model with models used in the transportation literature 
primarily discrete choice models. 
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After analyzing the PODS Passenger Choice Model in its entirety and 
relating it to the consumer choice literature, the two subsequent chapters focus 
on one particular element of the choice model: passenger preference for flight 
schedule. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on schedule choice in intercity travel 
and compares it to the approach used in PODS. Based on that analysis, 
alternative approaches are designed. 
 
In Chapter 5, PODS is used to simulate the impact of alternative 
approaches to model passenger preference for flight schedule. Detailed analysis 
of the simulation results is included in this chapter. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of the findings 
from the literature review, the comparison between the PODS approach and the 
methods used in the literature and the flight schedule case study. At the very end 
of this chapter, we address some of the issues for future research directions 
involving the PODS Passenger Choice Model and discrete choice models in air 
transportation. 
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Chapter 2  Discrete Choice Models 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Discrete choice models describe decision-makers’ choice among various 
alternatives. To fit within a discrete choice model framework, the set of 
alternatives called the choice set must exhibit three properties: the alternatives 
must be mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive and the number of 
alternatives must be finite. Indeed, the first and second criteria are not restrictive 
as the researcher can always ensure that the alternatives are mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive by an appropriate definition. In contrast, the third 
condition is actually restrictive as it is the defining characteristic of discrete 
choice models and distinguishes their realm of application in consumer choice 
theory from that of regression models, where the dependent variable is 
continuous, which means that there are an infinite number of possible outcomes.  
 
In addition, discrete choice models usually assume that the decision-
maker has a rational behavior and will choose the alternative that maximizes its 
utility. However, the utility that each alternative brings to the decision-maker is 
not known with certainty but is divided into two parts: an observed element 
known to the researcher and a random element, which remains unknown. As a 
result, the researcher is not able to predict precisely the choice of the decision-
maker (the alternative that maximizes its utility) but rather estimates the 
probability that each alternative might be chosen. This probability depends on 
the observed part of the utility known to the researcher and the assumed 
distribution of the error terms (random element). As a result, discrete choice 
models are known as random utility maximizing models. 
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 The purpose of the PODS Passenger Choice Model is to reproduce the 
choice of individual travelers among various travel alternatives defined along 
three dimensions: the choice of an airline, a flight schedule and a fare class. In the 
real world, air travelers have a choice between various travel alternatives when 
planning a trip. The number of available alternatives varies market by market 
based on the number of airlines serving that market, the number of flights 
offered by each airline and the number of fare-class products they actually 
market. However, this number is always finite for a given time period. Each 
individual traveler has to make a choice among a finite number of possible travel 
alternatives. The choice set might vary across decision-makers based on their 
preferences or on their access to information but the number of alternatives is 
always finite.  
 
As a result, the choice of a travel alternative by an individual air traveler 
fits within the discrete choice model framework. The study of the most widely 
used discrete choice models, with their respective strengths and weaknesses is 
then necessary to better understand the design of the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model and to compare it to the approaches usually used in the literature.  
 
2.2. The Logit Model 
 
The logit model is by far the easiest and most widely used discrete choice 
model. The description of the logit model in this section is based on Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman (1985). The popularity of logit is due to its mathematical simplicity: 
the formula for the choice probabilities takes a closed form and is readily 
interpretable. To derive the logit model, let us introduce the following notation. 
A decision-maker labeled n faces a choice among J alternatives. The utility that 
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the decision-maker obtains from alternative j is decomposed into a part labeled 
Vnj that is known by the researcher and an unknown part εnj that is supposed to 
be random: 
 
Unj = Vnj + εnj ∀ j 
 
  The logit model is obtained by assuming that each random element εnj is 
distributed independently and identically extreme value.  The probability that 
the decision-maker n chooses alternative i ∈ J is then:   
 
   Prob (Vni + εni > Vnj + εnj) ∀ j 
  ⇔    Prob (Vni - Vnj > εnj - εni) ∀ j 
 
Given the extreme value distribution of the error term, the choice 
probability of alternative i becomes: 
 
∑=
j
Vj
Vii
)exp(
)exp()Pr(  
If Vj = a Xj ∀ j with Xj observed by the researcher the formula then becomes: 
  
   ∑=
j
aXj
aXii
)exp(
)exp()Pr(  
The value of the parameters a can be estimated using maximum likelihood 
techniques. 
 
Using the extreme value distribution for the error terms is nearly the same 
as assuming that they are normally distributed. The extreme value distribution 
gives slightly fatter tails than a normal, which means that it allows for slightly 
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more aberrant behavior than a normal distribution. But the key assumption of 
the logit model is not the shape of the distribution but the independence of the 
error terms. This means that the unobserved utility of one alternative is unrelated 
to that of another alternative, which can be fairly restrictive. Stated equivalently, 
this means that the researcher has specified the systematic part of the utility Vnj 
precisely enough that the remaining unobserved portion is just essentially white 
noise. This can be considered as the ideal goal of any researcher: specify the 
utility so well that a logit model is appropriate. Seen in this way, the logit model 
is ideal rather than restrictive. If the researcher thinks that the unobserved 
portion of the decision-maker utility is correlated across alternatives, he has 
basically three options: use a different model that allows for such a correlation, 
re-specify the systematic utility so that errors are now uncorrelated or use the 
logit model as an approximation. The last option might however lead to some 
errors, especially if the researcher plans to investigate substitution patterns.  
 
The logit model has two main advantages: its mathematical simplicity and 
a very large flexibility in the definition of the choice set. As already mentioned, 
the choice probabilities take a closed form and are very easy to calculate. In 
addition, the choice set can vary from an individual to the next individual and 
only a subset of the alternatives can be included in a decision maker particular 
choice set. Indeed, the standard logit estimation procedure by likelihood 
maximization remains valid if only a subset of alternatives is included in the 
choice set, if all alternatives have the same chance of being chosen into each 
decision-maker choice set (uniform conditioning).  
  
However, the logit model has also three main weaknesses: it cannot 
accommodate random taste variation in the population, it implies a very specific 
substitution pattern and it is not appropriate to deal with panel data. Let us 
examine first the issue of random taste variation. Random taste variation occurs 
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when there is heterogeneity in the population response to an alternative 
attribute.  
 
For instance, the impact of a Saturday night stay restriction associated 
with a discount fare may vary from traveler to traveler and this variation might 
be unobserved by the researcher. Some travelers, especially those with family 
commitments, might consider that having to stay over the weekend at their 
destination is a very serious disadvantage and has a very negative impact on 
their utility: they will give a very high value to the Saturday night stay 
coefficient. However, for some other travelers like young unmarried students, 
staying at destination over the weekend might not be such a hassle and could 
even be seen as an opportunity. These passengers will give a very low value to 
the Saturday night stay coefficient. As a result, the coefficient of the Saturday 
night stay in the utility function of the discount fare alternative is not fixed but 
follows an unknown distribution: this variation in the population response is 
called random taste variation.  
 
If tastes vary with unobserved parts of the utility, then the logit model is 
not appropriate as the error terms will necessarily be correlated across 
alternatives. A logit model is then a misspecification. As an approximation it 
might be able to capture the average taste fairly well since the logit formula is 
typically fairly robust to misspecifications. However, even if the logit model 
were to provide an acceptable approximation of the average taste, it does not 
give information on the distribution of tastes around the average. This 
distribution can be important in many situations and to incorporate random taste 
variation appropriately, a mixed logit model will be preferred. 
 
In addition to the random taste variation issue, the logit model implies a 
very specific substitution pattern among alternatives. Due to the assumption of 
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independence between error terms, the ratio of choice probabilities of two 
alternatives remains constant (the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
property or IIA property) and there is a proportional substitution between 
alternatives. Any increase in the choice probability of one alternative leads to a 
decrease in choice probabilities of all other alternatives by the same percent. This 
very specific substitution pattern can be clearly unrealistic in some situations as 
illustrated by the famous blue bus/red bus paradox.  
 
Suppose that a commuter has the choice between using his private car or 
riding the bus to go to work and that each alternative has a 50% choice 
probability. Now suppose that another bus service is introduced that is equal to 
the existing buses in all its attributes except for the color of the bus. We now have 
red and blue buses as well as driving a private car as the all the available 
alternatives. Under the logit model, the choice probability of each alternative is 
33.33%. However, this is unrealistic because the commuter will most likely 
consider the two bus modes as similar and treat them as a single alternative: in 
this case the probability of the car alternative will remain 50% and each of the 
bus alternatives will have a 25% choice probability. Proportional substitution 
between alternatives in this case seems completely unrealistic and the logit 
specification is not an appropriate approach to model such a choice situation. 
 
However, as already mentioned, the IIA property of the logit model has a 
major advantage: it allows to estimate model parameters consistently only on a 
subset of alternatives (if each decision-maker choice set is chosen randomly). 
This can be a tremendous benefit when the number of alternatives is so high that 
estimation would be otherwise too computer-intensive. It allows also great 
flexibility as the choice set can vary across decision-makers. 
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Whether the IIA property seems realistic or not can be tested. Indeed, if 
the IIA property holds, the coefficient estimates obtained on a subset of 
alternatives are not significantly different from those obtained on the full set of 
alternatives. A test of that hypothesis constitutes a test of the IIA property and 
several procedures have been defined like for instance the McFadden-Hausman 
test (McFadden and Hausman, 1984). In addition, as the logit model is often a 
special case of more complex models, the IIA property can generally easily be 
tested.  
 
The third limitation of the logit model is with panel data. Data that 
represent repeated choice over time by the same decision-maker are called panel 
data. If the unobserved factors that affect the choice of decision-makers are 
independent over the repeated choices, then logit can be used with panel data. 
However, in most cases, errors can be assumed to be correlated over time. In 
these situations, either the model needs to be re-specified to bring the sources of 
correlation into the observed part of the utility or another model like mixed logit 
should be used. 
 
The air traveler choice problem i.e. the choice by an individual air traveler 
of an airline, a flight schedule and a fare class might involve all three main 
limitations of the logit model. For instance, we can reasonably assume that there 
is some significant heterogeneity in the response of the air traveler population to 
some parameters like schedule convenience or the disutilities associated with 
low-fare restrictions. Indeed, air travelers flying for business purposes are known 
to place a high emphasis on schedule convenience and flexibility and people 
flying for leisure purposes on price. Even within the population of business and 
leisure travelers, they should be significant differences on how passengers value 
these elements of their utility function. 
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In addition, in the case of the air traveler problem, we do not expect the 
IIA property to hold. Indeed, we expect for instance a higher degree of 
substitution among lower restricted discounted fare class products than between 
discounted fare classes and fully flexible full fare products. Similarly a higher 
degree of substitution can be expected between two flights offered by the same 
airline and two flights offered by two different airlines. As a result, a model able 
to accommodate more flexible substitution patterns than the logit model may be 
preferred.  
 
Finally, a large proportion of air traffic is actually flown by a relatively 
small population of regular frequent fliers. Indeed, most airlines have developed 
very complex and extensive frequent flyer programs. Membership to these 
frequent flyer programs is open to all air travelers but their benefits are non-
linear and they are especially targeted to seduce that regular frequent flyer 
population. These regular users of air travel services typically make repeated 
choices of airlines, flight schedule and fare class and these repeated choices can 
be assumed to be fairly correlated over time based on the decision-maker 
preferences and characteristics. As a result, a model able to take into account 
some correlation between repeated choices over time might be useful to our 
analysis of the air traveler choice problem. 
 
In the case of the air traveler choice problem, the assumptions of the logit 
model are actually fairly restrictive. Another model specification that is able to 
account for random taste variation, complex substitution patterns and correlation 
between repeated choices over time is probably more appropriate. The next two 
sections will then describe two alternatives to the standard logit specification: the 
Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) family of models that allows integrating more 
complex substitutions patterns and the mixed logit model, which is fully general 
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and highly flexible and provides a solution to all three limitations of the logit 
model. 
 
2.3. The GEV Family of Discrete Choice Models 
  
Generalized extreme value (GEV) models constitute a large class of 
models that exhibit a variety of substitution patterns. GEV models are consistent 
with utility maximization and their unifying attribute is that the unobserved 
portion of utility for all alternatives is jointly distributed as a generalized extreme 
value, which allows for some correlation patterns across alternatives. GEV 
models relax one of the three limitations of the logit model and have the 
advantage that the choice probabilities usually take a closed form such that they 
can be relatively easily estimated without resorting to simulation. 
 
The most widely used model of the GEV family is called the nested logit 
model. The nested logit model is appropriate when alternatives can be grouped 
into nests and exhibit the following substitution patterns: the ratio of the choice 
probabilities of any two alternatives in the same nest is independent of the 
attributes or existence of other alternatives. IIA holds within the nest. However, 
for two alternatives in different nests, the ratio of probabilities can depend on the 
attributes of other alternatives. IIA does not hold across nests. The error terms 
are correlated for two alternatives in the same nest but remain independent for 
alternatives in different nests.  
 
A consistent way to picture the substitution patterns is with a tree 
diagram. In such a tree, each branch denotes a subset of alternatives within 
which IIA holds and every leaf on each branch denotes an alternative. There is 
proportional substitution across twigs within a branch but not across branches. 
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The tree in Figure 2.1. illustrates the situation in which there is a proportional 
substitution pattern among various flights offered by the same airline but not 
across flights from different airlines:  
 
 
 
Airline B Airline A  
 
 
 
Flight A1 Flight A2 Flight B1 Flight B2 
 
Figure 2.1. : The nested logit tree structure 
 
In this case, if airline A were to introduce a third flight in the market, 
demand for flights A1 and A2 would decrease by the same proportion but that 
proportion would be different from the decrease in passenger demand for flights 
B1 and B2.  
 
If we suppose that Unj = Vnj + εnj ∀ j where Vnj is observed by the 
researcher and εnj is an unobserved random variable, the nested logit model is 
obtained by assuming that the vector of errors has a certain type of generalized 
extreme value distribution. Then, the choice probabilities take a closed form and 
the model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. The standard 
logit model is of course a special case of the nested logit model in which the 
generalized extreme value of the error terms collapses into an iid extreme value 
distribution. Indeed, it is possible to test the nested logit specification against the 
logit specification and verify if IIA might hold across nests (McFadden and 
Hausman, 1984). 
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 If the nested logit model has the ability to accommodate some non-
proportional substitution patterns, it can only apply if the choice situation can fit 
within this particular tree structure. This means that alternatives can be grouped 
into nests and that the choice problem must be divided into several dimensions 
with a specific hierarchy between these dimensions. In the example above, the 
choice of passengers is bi-dimensional with first the selection of an airline and 
then the selection of a particular flight schedule. We will discuss in the next 
chapter whether such a hierarchy is appropriate in the case of the air traveler 
choice problem.  
 
In the standard nested logit, each alternative belongs to only one nest. 
This limitation is sometimes restrictive and several kinds of GEV models have 
been specified with overlapping nests to accommodate more complex 
substitution patterns. However, the GEV family of models does not provide the 
researcher with a complete freedom in exploring all kinds of substitution 
patterns. In addition, GEV models are not a solution to the other two limitations 
of the logit model i.e. random taste variation and panel data. The next section 
describes the mixed logit model, which resolves all three limitations of the logit 
model but, unlike logit and GEV models, requires the use of simulation methods 
to estimate the choice probabilities. 
 
2.4.  The Mixed Logit Model 
 
 Mixed logit is a highly flexible model that can approximate any random 
utility model. It resolves all three limitations of standard logit models and allows 
for random taste variation, any substitution pattern and correlation in 
unobserved factors over time. The mixed logit model is defined on the basis of 
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the functional form of its choice probabilities. Any behavioral specification 
whose derived choice probabilities take this form is called a mixed logit. The 
description of the mixed logit model in this section is based on Train (2000). 
 
Mixed logit choice probabilities are the integral of standard logit 
probabilities over a density of parameters. 
 
Pni = ∫ Lni(β)ƒ(β)∂β 
where ∑=
j
Vnj
Vni
))(exp(
))(exp()Lni( β
ββ   
 
and ƒ(β) is a density function. Vni(β) is a portion of utility that depends on 
parameters β. If utility is linear in β, then Vni(β) = β’ xni. Then the mixed logit 
probability takes its usual form: 
 
∫ ∑=
j
xnj
xni
)'exp(
)'exp()Pni( β
ββ ƒ(β)∂β 
 
  It is a weighted average of logit choice probabilities evaluated at different 
values of the parameters β with the weights given by the density ƒ(β). In the 
statistics literature, the weighted average of several functions is called a mixed 
function and the distribution that provides the weights the mixing distribution.  
 
Standard logit is a special case of mixed logit model, where the mixing 
distribution is degenerated to fixed parameters. This mixing distribution can also 
be discrete. A discrete function can be a useful specification if there are distinct 
segments in the population, each of which has its own behavioral pattern. In 
most cases, it is however a continuous function. It can be specified to be a normal 
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or lognormal distribution. By specifying the explanatory variables and mixing 
distribution appropriately, the researcher can represent any type of random 
utility maximizing behavior as well as many forms of non-utility maximizing 
behavior. 
 
An issue of terminology arises in mixed logit models. There are two sets of 
parameters that enter a mixed logit formula. There are the parameters used in the 
logit formula and there are the parameters that describe the mixing distribution, 
typically its mean and variance. Usually, the researcher is interested in 
estimating the second ones. As a result, we will focus here on estimation 
techniques to get estimates of the mixing distribution parameters.  
 
Using a mixed logit specification to represent random taste variation is 
then straightforward. The utility specification is the same as for standard logit 
except that the parameters are supposed to vary across decision-makers rather 
than being fixed (the parameters are random variables). For each decision-maker, 
the researcher observed the value of the explanatory variable but neither their 
coefficient, nor the unobserved part of the utility function. The researcher has 
then to specify a distribution for each coefficient of the systematic utility and 
estimate the parameters of this distribution. Several specifications are possible: 
normal but also lognormal when the coefficient is known to have the same sign 
for all decision-makers like for instance a price or cost coefficient.  
 
For instance, if we go back to the example of the Saturday night stay 
requirement developed in Section 2.2., as mentioned earlier, in a logit model, we 
need to assume that the coefficient of the Saturday night stay restriction is fixed. 
However, under a mixed logit specification, the coefficient of this restriction is 
not necessarily fixed. It can vary from one decision-maker to the next. For 
instance, we can assume that it follows a normal distribution and estimate its 
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mean and variance. As a result, a mixed logit specification allows the researcher 
to investigate heterogeneity in response of the population to some part of the 
utility function. 
 
A mixed logit model can also be used without a random coefficient 
interpretation but to simply represent error components that create correlation 
among the utilities of different alternatives. The error component is then 
composed of two terms, one that is distributed iid extreme value across 
alternatives and another one that can be correlated over alternatives. Various 
correlation patterns, hence substitution patterns, can be obtained by an 
appropriate choice of the variables that enter the error component. For example, 
an analog of nested logit is obtained by specifying a dummy variable for each 
nest that equals 1 if the alternative belongs to the nest and zero otherwise. The 
variance of the dummy coefficient will capture the magnitude of the correlation 
of alternatives that belong to the nest. 
 
In fact, any random utility model can be approximated by a mixed logit 
specification with the appropriate choice of variables and mixing distribution. A 
mixed logit specification just requires that part of the error component is 
distributed iid extreme value. Adding an iid extreme value term to the utility of 
all alternatives might change the decision-maker behavior. However, by scaling 
up the utilities appropriately, the researcher can assure that this will never occur. 
As a result, adding an extreme value term to the true utility, which makes the 
model into a mixed logit does not change it in any meaningful way when the 
scale of the utility is sufficiently large. A mixed logit can approximate any 
random utility model by simply scaling up utility sufficiently. However, in most 
cases, this scaling-up might not be necessary if some part of the true utility can 
be assumed to be iid extreme value. In this case, the researcher’s task is just to 
 29
find variables and a mixing distribution that capture the other parts of utility, i.e. 
the parts that are correlated.  
 
Once the researcher has specified the model, the estimation procedure is 
composed of two steps. First, the choice probabilities are approximated by 
simulation. The choice probability simulation proceeds as follows: draws of the 
parameters are taken from the mixing distribution. Then, for each draw, the 
choice probability is calculated using the classical logit formula. The simulated 
choice probability is the average of the choice probabilities calculated for each 
draw of the parameters. These simulated estimates are unbiased estimators of the 
true choice probabilities. Their variance diminishes as the number of draws used 
in the simulation increases.  
 
In a second step, these choice probabilities estimates are used to estimate 
the mixing distribution parameters through for instance a maximum likelihood 
procedure. Under some conditions, these simulated maximum likelihood 
estimators will be unbiased and consistent estimates of the unknown true 
parameters. 
 
2.5. Some Applications in the Air Transportation Literature 
 
 Prossaloglou and Koppelman (1999) use a logit model to investigate the 
choice of air carrier, flight and fare-class. They consider air travelers as rational 
decision-makers that choose the alternative with the highest utility. The authors 
justify the existence of an error term in the trip utility function to account for the 
lack of complete information, possible measurement errors and the inability to 
properly observe and account for all factors affecting choice behavior. The factors 
that are examined as explanatory variables include fare class restrictions, fares, 
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carrier market presence, quality of service, participation in carrier frequent flyer 
programs and flight schedules. Separate models were estimated for business and 
leisure passengers.  
 
 Estimation of these logit models is based on stated-preference data. Data 
collection was based on a two-tier survey: initial data concerning passenger 
characteristics (past trips, trip purpose, permanent address, frequent flyer 
membership) was collected through a mail survey. A random sample of mail 
survey respondents was then chosen for a phone-based survey designed to 
simulate individual travelers’ search for information about air travel options and 
the selection among available alternatives like during a booking process. Based 
on the answers to the mail survey, each interviewee was presented with the 
scenario of either a business trip or a vacation trip in one of the two following 
markets: ORD-DEN (7 morning flights available on three different airlines) or 
DFW-DEN (9 morning flights available on 4 different airlines). Business travelers 
had a three-day advance notice and had the choice between three fare classes: 
first class, unrestricted coach and restricted coach. Leisure travelers had three-
week advance notice and also the choice between three fare classes all with 
restrictions. Each traveler had to ask the agent over the phone on the available 
alternatives (carrier, flight, fare class) and finally make a booking decision based 
on the information provided and their own preferences like during a booking 
process with a regular travel agent.  
 
The results of the model suggest significant differences in travel behavior 
between leisure and business travelers. As expected, business travelers are more 
time-sensitive and less price-sensitive than leisure travelers. Indeed, business 
travelers are willing to pay $60 per hour of reduced schedule delay compared to 
only $17 for leisure travelers. They also place more emphasis on frequent flyer 
programs. They are willing to pay a $21 premium to travel on an airline, which 
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frequent flyer program they already belong to and $52 more to fly with the 
airline of their most preferred frequent flyer program. For leisure passengers, 
those values are only $7 and $18 respectively.  
 
In addition, there has been a number of studies of airport choice in multi-
airport regions that are based on discrete choice models, especially logit and 
nested logit models. For instance, Kanafani (1983) uses a multinomial logit model 
to study the choice the choice of airports by air travelers flying between the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area and the San Francisco Bay area. The explanatory 
variables in his model include for instance the frequency of service at each 
airport and the level of the fares. 
 
Regarding the application of mixed logit models to the air transportation 
field, Mehndiratta (1996) studies in his doctoral dissertation the impact of time of 
day preferences on the scheduling of business trips in the domestic US focusing 
mainly on trips involving air transportation. His assumption is that the current 
models used in inter-city travel analysis do not take into account the spatial and 
temporal variations in the value of time and that these variations have a large 
influence on the choice of travel alternatives at the individual level. He attempts 
to incorporate these variations in a discrete choice model and to study their 
impact on the selection of travel alternatives. 
 
 Mehndiratta divided a regular 24-hour schedule into three periods: work, 
leisure and sleep time. He proposed and formulated a theory to accommodate 
variations in the value of time among these three periods of the day. He then 
proceeded to implement his theoretical approach. As he wanted to test whether 
there might be some heterogeneity in the population response, he used a mixed 
logit model specification to study the impact of disruption of work, leisure and 
sleep time on the choice of intercity travel alternatives. The coefficients for the 
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value of disruption of leisure and sleep time were specified to be random. Based 
on stated preference data, he estimated the mean and standard deviation of the 
distribution of these random coefficients. As the standard deviation of these 
coefficients turned out to be statistically significant, the assumption of 
heterogeneity in response of the population to disruption of various periods of 
their regular schedule was validated.  
 
In addition, another conclusion of this study is that business travelers tend 
to give a higher value to sleeping time than to work and leisure time. In addition, 
sleep and leisure time spent at home or around home is more valuable than 
leisure time and sleep time at the business destination. As a result, travelers will 
avoid staying overnight at their destination unless staying home and leaving 
very early in the morning would disrupt too largely their normal sleep schedule. 
 
2.6.  Summary 
  
 In this chapter, we have described the most widely used discrete choice 
models with their respective strengths and weaknesses. In addition, we have 
shown how these models have been used to study a variety of choice situations 
that air travelers may face including the choice of an airline, a flight schedule and 
a fare class. In the next section, we will describe how these choices are modeled 
in PODS and how the PODS Passenger Choice Model relates to these theoretical 
models used in consumer choice theory in general and in air transportation 
choice in particular. 
 33
Chapter 3  The PODS Passenger Choice Model 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, we have described the discrete choice models 
usually found in the literature on consumer choice theory and applied in the air 
transportation field. This chapter will concentrate on the Passenger Origin-
Destination Simulator and in particular on its passenger choice model that 
reproduces the choice process of an individual air traveler among various 
possible travel alternatives. After a general overview of the simulator, we will 
focus on a description of all the elements that affect air traveler choice, how they 
are modeled in PODS and how the PODS approach relates to the theory 
introduced in the previous chapter. 
 
3.2. Overview of the PODS Simulator 
 
PODS is a computer simulation tool designed to investigate airline 
revenue management techniques. It was originally developed by Hopperstad, 
Berge and Filipowski at the Boeing Company and is an extension of the Boeing 
Decision Window Model used to study the impact of flight schedules on airline 
market share. For a description of the Boeing Decision Window Model, the 
reader is referred to Chapter 4. PODS has served as a revenue management 
experimental tool for the PODS consortium, a partnership between MIT and 
seven major international airlines.  
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To this end, PODS simulates millions of choices by individual air travelers 
flying over a network of origin-destination markets served by several airlines. 
More precisely, it simulates the interactions between passengers and airlines 
during the booking period for a single day of departure. The booking period 
extends over 16 successive time frames, the first time frame beginning 63 days 
before departure and the last ending on the departure day. After the simulation 
is over, it is possible to analyze the results of each airline. The simulation outputs 
are the results of these individual choices and include airline traffic, revenues 
and loads. With these outputs, researchers are able to analyze the relative 
performance of various revenue management strategies. 
 
To this end, PODS runs an iterative process, performing multiple “trials” 
for the same departure day. This allows the airlines to progressively build the 
historical database they need to operate the forecasting component of their 
revenue management systems: initial numbers in the database are progressively 
replaced by passenger demand that results from the choices of thousands of 
individual air travelers. To be more precise, under the current default settings, 
each PODS simulation consists of 5 independent trials, each composed of 600 
successive (and thus correlated) simulations of a departure day (also called a 
sample). The initial 200 samples of each trial are discarded to eliminate the initial 
condition effects, and the results from the 5 trials are averaged to give stable and 
statistically significant results. Under these settings, in the most widely used 
network environment (PODS Network D), simulation results are then the 
outcome of the simulation of 2,000 departure days or samples with about 16,000 
booking requests per sample. This means that each PODS run involves in 
Network D the simulation of the choice process of 32,000,000 air trips.  
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The PODS architecture consists of four components, which are linked as 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
 
The first component is the historical database. It is created by keeping a 
record of booking histories starting from the first booking of the simulation.  
These booking histories are then used to generate forecasts for future flights. 
Forecasting demand is the task of the second component of the PODS simulator, 
i.e. the forecaster. Indeed, to set the booking limits for each fare class of future 
flight departures, the revenue management optimizer requires as inputs a 
demand forecast by fare class or path class based on the characteristics of the 
revenue management method used. In the following section, we describe the 
forecasting process for fare class demand forecasts. The process is similar for 
path class demand forecasts. 
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Demand forecasts are based on historical bookings for the same flight and 
fare class. There are currently four fare classes in PODS labeled Y, B, M and Q 
with Y being the most expensive fare. Demand forecasting consists of two steps:  
first, the forecaster performs detruncation of observed historical bookings. 
Indeed, if a fare class was closed before departure on a past flight, the bookings 
recorded in the historical database are a constrained observation of the actual 
demand for that flight/fare class. As a result, to estimate the total past demand 
for that flight/fare class, it is necessary to estimate what the demand would have 
been if there was no capacity constraint i.e. if capacity for that flight/fare class 
was infinite. Several detruncation methods can be used in PODS to get estimates 
of the unconstrained demand for a flight/fare class based on the observation of 
actual bookings constrained by capacity. In a second step, these estimates of the 
unconstrained demand by fare class of past flight departures are used to forecast 
unconstrained demand for future flights by fare class. Several techniques are 
available in PODS to perform forecasts based on these historical data. The 
forecasts are then transferred to the revenue management optimizer at the 
beginning of each time frame: they are updated 16 times during the booking 
process for each future flight departure to take advantage of the latest 
information recorded in the historical booking database. For a more complete 
description of forecasting and detruncation methods in PODS, the reader is 
referred to Zickus (1998). 
 
Based on the remaining capacity of the aircraft (total aircraft capacity 
minus current bookings) and the demand forecasts, the optimizer sets booking 
limits for each fare class on future flights. Booking limits are nested so that all of 
the remaining aircraft capacity is always available for booking requests in the 
highest fare class. Booking requests for each fare class will be accepted up to the 
booking limit set by the optimizer. Each time a booking is made, booking limits 
are decreased by one unit for that fare class and all fare classes above due to the 
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nested structure of fare class booking limits. As already mentioned, this booking 
also gets recorded in the historical database, which is constantly kept up to date. 
At the beginning of each time frame, booking limits are re-optimized based on 
updated forecasts delivered by the forecaster. For a description of the various 
revenue management methods, the reader should refer to Darot (2001). 
 
Finally, the last component of the simulator is the passenger choice model. 
This component generates the number of booking requests for each future flight 
departure. Then, based on passenger characteristics and fare class booking limits, 
each individual air traveler will choose among all the available travel alternatives 
that fulfills his travel need for getting from city A to city B. But before looking in 
more detail into the PODS Passenger Choice Model, the next section describes 
the most widely used network configurations. 
 
3.3.  PODS Network Configurations 
 
We will use in this thesis two different network configurations, Network 
D and Network E. Network D represents the US domestic market and Network E 
a transatlantic international alliance market. In addition, in Network D, 
competing airlines offer very similar schedules whereas in network E, one airline 
has a significant schedule advantage over its competitors. 
 
In Network D, two airlines compete in 482 US domestic origin-destination 
markets. Each airline offers 3 flights a day between its own hub and 40 spoke 
cities all over the US as well as to its competitor’s hub. All flights use 100-seat 
aircraft. Network D is unidirectional as all passengers travel from the West to the 
East, except bi-directional flights in the hub-to hub market. Each airline offers 
three connecting banks at their respective mid-continent hub and their schedules 
 38
are quite similar as the starting time of the connecting banks are the same for 
both airlines. Figure 3.2. below is a map of this US domestic network: 
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Figure 3.2. : Network D route map 
 
In Network E, four airlines (two US and two European airlines) compete 
over their own domestic market as well as over the transatlantic market. Each 
airline offers flights from 10 origin cities to 10 destination cities in its own 
continent (from the West to the East of the US and from northern Europe to 
southern  Europe). In addition, each airline offers transatlantic flights between its 
own hub and his alliance partner hub. As a result, each airline also offers 
transatlantic codeshare service to the 10 destination cities in its partner’s 
continent. Airlines use aircraft of various sizes depending on the level of demand 
in each market with aircraft of larger size being used for transatlantic services. 
Figure 3.3. is a map of this transatlantic network: 
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Figure 3.3. : Network E route map 
 
Unlike in Network D, each airline offers quite different schedules in 
Network E. Like in Network D, each airline has three connecting banks with 
arrivals from all domestic origin cities and departures to all domestic destination 
cities. Two of these banks also include transatlantic flights.  However, one of the 
US airline has a significant schedule advantage over its competitor thanks to a 
larger schedule coverage. European carriers have more similar schedules. Table 
3.1. details the bank starting times for all four carriers: 
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US Europe
Starting 
time
Dom. Int. 
Inbound
Int. 
Outbound
Starting 
time
Dom. Int. 
Inbound
Int. 
Outbound
Alliance A
(MSP-
FRA)
10 a.m. X X 7 a.m. X X X
3 p.m. X X X 12 p.m. X X X
8 p.m. X X 4 p.m. X
Alliance B
(DFW-
CDG)
12 p.m. X X 8 a.m. X X X
3 p.m. X X X 12 p.m. X X X
6 p.m. X X 4 p.m. X
Table 3.1. : Connecting banks in Network E 
 
3.4. The PODS Passenger Choice Model 
 
This section describes the various elements of the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model. As already mentioned, the design of the PODS Passenger Choice Model 
is based on previous work by Boeing, especially the Boeing Decision Window 
Model. It can be divided into four different steps: first demand for air travel gets 
generated, a set of characteristics is then defined for each individual traveler to 
model his preferences, then the passenger choice set is defined based on the 
passenger characteristics and the state of the airline inventory and, finally, each 
passenger makes travel decisions by matching the attributes of all available 
travel alternatives and his own preferences. Figure 3.4. illustrates the structure of 
the passenger choice model:  
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Figure 3.4. : The structure of the PODS Passenger Choice Model 
 
3.4.1. Demand Generation 
 
The first step of the Passenger Choice Model is to calculate the number of 
potential passengers who will make a booking request in a particular origin-
destination market for example Los Angeles to New York. Air travelers are 
divided in PODS into two types based on trip purpose: leisure and business 
passengers are modeled separately and as we will see later on, they have 
different characteristics based on different behavioral assumptions. As a result, 
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demand for air travel in each market is divided into demand for business and 
leisure travel.  
 
Until recently (PODS Network D), the average demand for air travel was 
determined in each market through a gravity model based on the attractiveness 
of the origin and destination cities and the passenger mix was equally divided 
between business and leisure passengers. However, with the introduction of the 
international alliance network (PODS Network E), demand for air transportation 
is now based on real data provided by consortium member airlines. As a result, 
the split between business and leisure passengers now varies by market: in the 
international alliance network, some markets are largely dominated by leisure 
demand like for instance southern European destinations, whereas some other 
markets are more business-oriented.  
 
Once the average demand for air transportation services has been 
determined for every O-D market in the PODS network, the simulator computes 
the demand for every single travel day (sample). The demand generation process 
does not incorporate some variability elements like seasonality or variations in 
the level of demand according to day of the week. However, even without taking 
these two elements into account, demand for air transportation will vary from 
one departure day (sample) to the next and some of this variation which cannot 
be easily explained or forecasted is modeled in the simulator. 
 
To incorporate random deviations around the average demand, PODS 
follows the common industry practice of assessing a variability measure that 
depends on the magnitude of the mean. Two alternatives forms have been 
suggested to represent this stochastic variation referred to as k- and z-factors. 
PODS employs a combination of these two approaches to calculate the deviation 
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from mean of the demand for air travel in a specific O-D market for a particular 
departure date. 
 
Application of a k-factor supposes that the standard deviation σ of a 
random variable is a constant times the mean µ, σ = kµ. From empirical analysis 
of airline demand data, researchers at Boeing have found that a k-value of 0.3 can 
be typically observed. If demand for air transportation is modeled as normally 
distributed, this means that 68% of the observations will be in the µ ± σ range. 
Alternatively the z-factor approach suggests that the variation is proportional to 
the variance σ2, or  σ2 = zµ. More detail about variation in demand by departure 
day can be found in Wilson (1995). 
 
Given the total number of booking requests for each departure date or 
sample, the allocation during the booking process must still be determined. The 
booking process in PODS starts 63 days before departure and is divided into 16 
time frames, which are defined at the system-wide level. Time frames are 
initially as long as one week but their duration diminishes as the departure date 
becomes closer to reflect a more intense booking activity.  
 
The allocation of the booking requests among the time frames is modeled 
through a booking arrival curve. These curves are different for business and 
leisure travelers as industry experience has shown that leisure travelers tend to 
book earlier than business travelers, a trend that is strengthened by the advance 
purchase requirements associated with lower fares (Y, B, M and Q have 
respectively 0, 7, 14 and 21-day advance purchase requirements in our PODS 
scenarios). In addition, they incorporate the impact of advance purchase 
requirements on the booking process with a stronger booking activity before the 
threshold booking dates of the lower fare-classes, especially for leisure travelers. 
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Figure 3.5. displays the booking curves used in all markets for business and 
leisure travelers:  
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Figure 3.5. : PODS booking curves 
 
Once the number of passengers of both types wishing to travel in all O-D 
markets on a particular date has been calculated, the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model must determine the characteristics of every single passenger, 
characteristics that will have a large influence on the final selection of a travel 
alternative. 
 
3.4.2. Passenger Characteristics 
 
Each passenger that intends to travel and makes a booking request in 
PODS gets assigned a set of characteristics to represent his preferences for 
various elements of the air transportation service. Based on those characteristics 
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and the attributes of all available travel alternatives, a passenger will select a 
travel option. These characteristics have then a major influence on passenger 
choice behavior in PODS. They can be divided into three main elements: each 
individual traveler gets assigned a decision window, a maximum willingness to 
pay and a set of passenger disutilities.  
 
3.4.2.1. Decision Window 
 
As already mentioned, the PODS Passenger Choice Model is based on the 
Boeing Decision Window Model. In order to represent his preferences for a 
particular schedule, each passenger gets assigned a time decision window. The 
boundaries of this time window represent respectively the earliest departure 
time and the latest convenient arrival time that fulfill a passenger’s original 
schedule constraints. The concept is that most travelers’ schedule plans and time 
constraints do not require looking for a specific single departure time. Each 
passenger’s schedule plan and constraints can be satisfied through a range of 
convenient travel times that ensure a satisfactory solution to his own time-space 
problem. 
 
Two parameters define a decision window: its width and its position 
during the day. The width of a decision window is the sum of the minimum 
travel time in the market and a random element called the schedule tolerance. 
The value of the schedule tolerance is defined randomly for each single traveler 
but depends on the market stage length and the passenger trip purpose. Decision 
windows are on average shorter for business travelers than for leisure travelers 
to reproduce the emphasis people traveling on business place on time and 
schedule. In addition, schedule tolerance is smaller in short-haul markets than in 
long-haul markets. The position of the decision window is defined such as to 
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reproduce the typical time of the day distribution of demand in every market 
with typically peak demand in the morning and late afternoon. 
 
All path/classes that fit into a decision window (i.e. for which departure 
time is after the beginning of the time window and arrival time before the end of 
the time window) are equally schedule-attractive to the air traveler. All other 
path/classes are also equally unattractive to the air traveler and the difference 
between the two categories is modeled through a specific cost called the 
replanning disutility (see below, section 3.4.2.3.). 
 
3.4.2.2 . Maximum willingness to pay 
 
In addition to his decision window, each traveler gets assigned a 
maximum willingness to pay. This dollar value represents the maximum amount 
this passenger is willing to pay for his ticket. If the fare of a path/class is above 
that value, the passenger will not accept to travel on that path/class and will 
look for other alternatives to fulfill his travel needs.  
 
Maximum willingness to pay values are assigned randomly to passengers 
but there are set to reproduce willingness to pay curves designed to represent 
some expected passenger characteristics. The willingness to pay curves are not 
the same for business and leisure travelers. On average, business travelers have a 
much higher willingness to pay than leisure travelers. A very large proportion of 
them is ready to pay the most expensive fare (Y fare), if necessary. On the 
contrary, the willingness to pay curves are designed such that most leisure 
travelers will accept to pay only the most inexpensive fare (Q fare). 
 
The equation of the maximum willingness to pay curves is the following: 
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basefaref
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Where f = the fare in question 
Basefare = fare at which all potential travelers would travel 
e-mult = elasticity multiplier (of the base fare where 50% of the passengers are 
willing to travel) 
 
To differentiate the behavior of business and leisure travelers, the value of 
the basefare and the e-mult are different for the two categories. For leisure 
travelers the basefare is equal to the lowest fare (Q fare) but for business 
travelers, it is set at 2.5 times the Q fare. The e-mult is set to 1.2 and 3 for leisure 
and business travelers respectively.  
 
This means that all business travelers are ready to pay a fare up to 2.5 
times the lowest fare whereas all leisure travelers are willing to accept anything 
but that Q fare. In addition, 50% of the leisure travelers cannot afford a fare 
higher than 1.2 times the Q fare whereas 50% of the business travelers can afford 
up to 7.5 times the Q fare. 
 
As a result, almost all business travelers are typically willing to purchase 
the most expensive fare but a large proportion of the leisure travelers cannot 
afford anything but the cheapest fare. The design of the willingness to pay curves 
reproduces fundamental behavioral differences between business and leisure 
travelers and the dichotomy between a largely inelastic demand for business 
travel and a very price-sensitive demand for leisure travel.  
 
Table 3.2. describes an example of the willingness to pay curves used in 
PODS: 
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 Probability that a random passenger will pay at least 
 Q M B Y 
Pax Type $100  $150  $200  $400  
Business 100% 100% 100% 93% 
Leisure 100% 18% 3% 0% 
 
Table 3.2. : Maximum willingness to pay 
 
3.4.2.3. Passenger Disutilities 
 
In addition to a time decision window and a maximum willingness to pay, 
an additional set of characteristics is generated for each passenger and is used to 
calculate disutilities. Disutilities are used to represent additional non-monetary 
costs that depend on the attributes of each path/class and influence the choice of 
air travelers. There are two types of disutilities: the disutilities associated with 
the restrictions and other disutilities. 
 
Except for the Y full fare, all lower fare-classes have restrictions: the B fare 
has one restriction, the M fare has two of them and the Q fare three of them. Such 
a fare/restriction structure is typical of the pricing structure found in the airline 
industry since deregulation. In PODS, each passenger gets assigned a random 
value for the disutility or cost associated with each restriction. The average 
disutility is different for business and leisure travelers. For business travelers, the 
restrictions disutilities are designed such that on average, the passenger will 
prefer an unrestricted Y full-fare, and then respectively a B, M and Q fare. This 
means that, on average, for a business traveler, the dollar cost of a Y fare will be 
less than the sum of a B fare and its restriction disutility cost.  
 
Airlines usually design restrictions to achieve market segmentation: 
Restrictions are used to offer different products designed to fulfill the needs of 
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different market segments. For instance, restrictions are designed such that 
business travelers cannot usually meet them and then prefer to choose the full-
fare most of them are willing to pay for. For instance, lower fares require usually 
a Saturday night stay, a restriction most passengers traveling on business cannot 
fulfill as they typically travel on short trips during the week and want to return 
home to spend the weekend with their families. As a result, there would be little 
stimulation in business traffic if the lowest fares in the market were reduced 
because the restriction disutilities are high enough to make business travelers 
prefer a Y unrestricted full-fare.  
 
On the contrary, most leisure travelers are able to meet the restrictions 
requirements associated with the lower fares and then in PODS, the average 
restriction disutilities are lower for leisure than for business travelers. On 
average leisure travelers will prefer the most restricted Q fare, then the M, B and 
finally Y full fare. In addition, these restrictions are independent and their values 
are not correlated for a single passenger. Table 3.3. gives an example of the 
average restriction disutility costs for business and leisure travelers in a market 
with a Q fare of $100. 
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Pax 
Type Fare Class Y B M Q 
Avg Res. 1 N/A $225.00 $225.00 $225.00 
Avg Res. 2 N/A N/A $75.00 $75.00 
Avg Res. 3 N/A N/A N/A $75.00 
Fare $400.00 $200.00 $150.00 $100.00 
Business Average Total cost $400.00 $425.00 $450.00 $475.00 
Avg Res. 1 N/A $175.00 $175.00 $175.00 
Avg Res. 2 N/A N/A $25.00 $25.00 
Avg Res. 3 N/A N/A N/A $25.00 
Fare $400.00 $200.00 $150.00 $100.00 
Leisure Average Total cost $400.00 $375.00 $350.00 $325.00 
 
Table 3.3. : Restriction disutility cost 
 
In addition to the restriction disutilities, there are three other disutilities 
included in the PODS Passenger Choice Model: replanning disutility, path 
quality index and unfavorite airline. These disutilities are once again 
independent for a single passenger and on average higher for business travelers 
than for leisure travelers.  
 
If a particular path/class is outside the decision window of a passenger, a 
replanning disutility is added to the cost of the path/class to take into account 
the inconvenience of the schedule. This cost is higher on average for business 
travelers that are known to place more emphasis on frequency of service and 
schedule but does not depend directly on the size of the decision window. For 
more information about passenger preference for schedule and replanning 
disutilities, the reader is referred to Chapter 4. 
 
Passengers usually prefer non-stop flights to connecting paths. In order to 
take this into account, each path/class gets assigned a path quality index. This 
index is equal to 1 for non-stop flights and 2 for connecting paths. The PQI 
disutility of each path/class is equal to a base disutility multiplied by the value 
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of the index. As a result, for the same passenger, the PQI disutility of a 
connecting path will be twice as much as that of a non-stop service. 
 
Finally, air travelers tend to have some preferences for a particular airline, 
in part due to frequent flyer programs the airlines have developed over the 
years. The frequent flyer programs are often non-linear and target primarily 
business passengers that tend to give them more importance than leisure 
travelers. To model these preferences, each passenger gets assigned in PODS a 
preferred airline and a randomly drawn unfavorite airline disutility. If a 
path/class is not operated by its favorite airline, the unfavorite airline disutility 
is added to the total cost of the path. The probability pfava that a passenger 
considers Airline A as his favorite carrier is determined by the airline coefficient 
of preference calpa  
 
∑=
i
i
a
a
calp
calppfav  
 
In PODS Network D, each airline has a coefficient of preference of 0.5, 
which means that 50% of the passengers will consider each airline as their 
favorite airline.  
 
All disutilities are defined randomly for each air traveler. However, on 
average, for both business and leisure travelers, they are a linear function of the 
market basefare that depends to some extent on the length of haul.  The intercept 
and the slope of the disutility functions have been calculated to reproduce some 
expected passenger behavior. These passenger behaviors have been defined 
through a survey of the marketing expertise of the member airlines. For instance, 
the path quality disutility is designed to decrease in relative terms with length of 
haul, as passengers flying to medium/long-haul destinations are supposed to be 
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more willing to accept a connection than passengers flying to a short-haul 
destination.  
 
In addition, as already mentioned, all disutilities are on average higher for 
business than for leisure passengers: business passengers are assumed to place 
more emphasis on non-monetary elements like the quality of the path, 
unrestricted fares, airline preference, schedule convenience than leisure 
passengers and to be less sensitive to price. Finally, all disutilities are assumed to 
be independent and to follow a normal distribution with a 0.3 k-factor, typical of 
air transportation demand according to marketing research conducted by 
Boeing. For more information on passenger disutilities, the reader should refer to 
Lee (2000). Table 3.4. summarizes the three latter average disutility costs for a 
market with a Q fare of $100. 
 
Pax type Market Base fare Replanning Unfavorite Airline Path quality 
Business $250.00 $61.56 $30.21 $22.23 
Leisure $100.00 $11.90 $9.02 $7.01 
 
Table 3.4. : Replanning, unfavorite airline and path quality disutility costs 
 
 
3.4.2.4. The Passenger Choice Set 
 
Once the simulator has generated the characteristics of a specific traveler, 
each traveler will make travel decisions through a two-step process: in the first 
step, the simulator will define the passenger choice set. In PODS network D, in 
most markets, up to 25 alternatives are potentially available: the air travelers 
have the choice among two airlines, three paths per airline, four fare classes per 
path (Y, B, M and Q classes) plus the no go alternative. Alternatives are also 
called path/classes and they are characterized by these two elements: the path 
(which includes the airline identity) and the fare class. The no go alternative is 
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included in the choice set of all air travelers. However, some of the other 24 
alternatives will be excluded from the passenger choice set for three reasons: 
 
• The revenue management controls: the alternative is unavailable and will 
be excluded from a passenger choice set if the airline inventory indicates 
that no availability remains for this path/class. Availability is based on the 
booking limits set by the optimizer at the beginning of each time frame 
minus the bookings that occurred so far during the time frame. 
 
• The advance purchase requirements associated with lower fare classes: in 
PODS B, M and Q classes have advance purchase requirements of 
respectively 21, 14 and 7 days. If a booking request occurs between 21 and 
14 days before the flight departure date, only Y, B and M classes will 
remain available and will be included in the passenger choice set. 
 
•  The willingness to pay: PODS will exclude from a passenger choice set 
any path/class that has a fare higher than the passenger maximum 
willingness to pay. 
 
Now that the passenger choice set has been defined, let us finally consider 
the decision rule used in PODS to determine which alternative will be chosen. 
 
3.4.2.5. The Passenger Choice 
 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the passenger choice set contains in 
most markets in PODS network D between 1 and 25 alternatives depending on 
the passenger willingness to pay, the date of the booking request and the state of 
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the airline inventory. Let us now consider the decision rule used to choose 
among path/classes that are included in a passenger choice set.  
 
As already mentioned, the choice set of any air traveler contains at least 
one alternative, the no go alternative. There are then two cases: if the passenger 
choice set contains only one alternative i.e. the no go alternative, the passenger 
will “choose” not to go. However, if there are at least two alternatives in the 
passenger choice set, the no go alternative will never be chosen and PODS will 
use  the following decision rule to select the most preferred alternative: the air 
traveler will consider additional non-monetary elements and a generalized cost 
is calculated for each alternative (except the no go alternative). This generalized 
cost is the sum of the fare and all additional disutilities that depend on: 
 
• the characteristics of this specific air traveler (O-D market, business or 
leisure, time window) 
• the fare/class (restrictions) 
• the path (airline, quality of the path, schedule)  
 
In order to choose among all path/classes considered, the generalized cost 
of each alternative is calculated by adding the fare and the sum of all six 
disutilities associated with the path/class for that particular passenger. The air 
traveler will then choose the path/class, which has the lowest generalized cost. 
As already mentioned business travelers tend to put more emphasis on the 
convenience of the path/class attributes and leisure travelers on the fare as all 
disutilities are on average largely higher for business travelers.  
 
Once an air traveler has chosen a path/class, the seat availability is 
updated by decreasing the airline inventory by one seat on the legs traversed by 
the path/class. In addition, this travel decision is recorded in the historical 
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database that feeds the forecaster and the optimizer components of the simulator 
used to set revenue management controls for the entire network at the end of 
each time frame.  
 
As a result, the decision rule currently used in PODS makes a distinction 
between monetary elements (willingness to pay) and non-monetary elements 
(disutilities). The choice of a particular path/class is based both on monetary 
(fare) and non-monetary (restrictions, passenger disutilities) considerations but 
this choice is conditional on the maximum willingness to pay requirement. Only 
path/classes which fare is lower than the passenger maximum willingness to 
pay are effectively included in a passenger choice set. 
 
3.5. Discrete Choice Models and the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model 
 
In this section, we examine the relationship between the PODS Passenger 
Choice Model and the discrete choice models usually found in the literature to 
study consumer choice and described in Chapter 2. We will investigate the 
similarities and differences between the PODS Passenger Choice Model and 
respectively the logit model, the nested logit model and finally the more flexible 
mixed logit model. 
 
3.5.1. PODS and the Logit Model 
 
The PODS Passenger Choice Model and logit models share three 
fundamental common characteristics. First, both models are utility maximizing 
models. In PODS, passengers choose the alternative included in their choice set 
that has the lowest generalized cost. This is equivalent to a utility maximizing 
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model as the generalized cost multiplied by minus 1 can be considered as a 
utility measure and multiplying the generalized cost by minus 1 for all 
alternatives does not change the outcome of the choice process for any decision-
maker. Choosing the alternative that has the lowest generalized cost or the 
highest utility is then equivalent. 
 
In addition, the second fundamental common characteristic between the 
PODS Passenger Choice Model and discrete choice models is that the number of 
alternatives in the consumer/passenger choice set is finite. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, this property defines the class of discrete choice models. Furthermore, 
as described in the previous section, the number of alternatives in a passenger 
choice set in PODS is finite as well: in network D, the passenger choice set can 
include up to 25 alternatives in most markets and at the maximum 49 in the more 
frequently served inter-hub market. 
 
Finally, the logit model is also particularly well suited to deal with choice 
sets that vary in size and composition from one decision-maker to the next. The 
PODS Passenger Choice Model creates such a situation as we have shown in the 
previous section that the passenger choice set varies from one passenger to the 
next based on the passenger characteristics (willingness to pay, time decision 
window), the date of the booking request and the state of the airline inventory. 
The ability of the logit model to accommodate variable choice sets could prove to 
be very useful in that respect. 
 
However, there are two fundamental differences between the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model and the logit model. First, the logit model cannot 
accommodate random taste variation i.e. heterogeneity in response in the 
population to a particular element of the decision-maker utility because random 
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taste variation violates one of the fundamental assumptions of the logit model, 
the independence between the error terms across alternatives.  
 
As we have shown in the previous section, all disutilities that are included 
in an alternative’s cost/utility in PODS vary from one passenger to the next and 
are randomly drawn from independent normal distributions. Only the fare 
component remains constant across all passengers. As a result, the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model is based on random taste variation and differs 
fundamentally from logit models that cannot accommodate random taste 
variation. 
 
To better understand the difference between PODS and logit models, let 
us take the example of restriction 1 that applies in PODS to all alternatives that 
involve a B, M or Q fare class. As mentioned earlier, the value of restriction 1 is 
drawn randomly for each passenger from a pre-defined normal distribution. As a 
result, for each passenger, the value of restriction 1 will deviate from the average 
of the restriction’s distribution. If we use a logit model, this deviation from the 
mean restriction disutility will be included in the random part of the utility 
function since a logit specification requires all coefficients to be fixed. As a result, 
for the same passenger, the random part of the utility function will include that 
same deviation for all alternatives that involve a B, M and Q fare class: error 
terms cannot then be considered to be independent across alternatives. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, if tastes vary with unobserved parts of the utility, then 
the logit model is not appropriate as the error terms will necessarily be correlated 
across alternatives. A logit model is then a misspecification and a more flexible 
model able to accommodate random taste variation is then needed to represent 
the passenger choice problem modeled in PODS. 
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In addition, the logit model assumption that error terms are independent 
across alternatives leads to a very specific substitution pattern: the proportional 
substitution pattern. Such a substitution pattern is not observed in PODS because 
the PODS Passenger Choice Model assumes random taste variation in some 
elements of the passenger utility function and we have shown that random taste 
variation creates correlation between error terms across alternatives.  
 
To show the difference in substitution patterns between the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model and the logit model, let us take an example. Let us 
assume that a business passenger has three alternatives in his choice set: 
 
• The no go alternative 
• A Y fare-class on airline 1 in a path that fits within his decision window 
• A Y fare-class on airline 2 in a path that also fits within his decision 
window 
 
Let us further assume that the B fare class becomes available only on 
airline 2. We will assume in that example that the Q, M, B, and Y fares in that 
market are set to respectively $100, $150, $200 and $400. Table 3.5. describes the 
market share of all three travel alternatives (the no go alternative is never chosen 
since there are some other travel alternatives in the passenger choice set): 
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28% 36% 36% 28% 32% 40% Yes 
N/A 50% 50% N/A 50% 50% No 
B2 Y2 Y1 B2 Y2 Y1  
MNL PODS PCM 
Table 3.5. : The PODS Passenger Choice Model and logit models 
 
 This example illustrates the difference in substitution patterns between 
the PODS Passenger Choice Model and a multinomial logit model: in the logit 
model, the proportion of passengers shifting to the new alternative – a B fare 
class on airline 2 – comes in similar proportion from passengers that chose 
initially airline 1 and 2. However, in PODS, the passengers shifting to the B class 
come primarily from passengers already traveling on airline 2. The PODS 
Passenger Choice Model exhibits a more realistic substitution pattern as one 
would expect passengers to be more willing to shift to a different fare class on 
the same airline than to modify both fare class and carrier identity at the same 
time. As a result, the use of a multinomial logit approach in PODS would under-
estimate airline 1 market share in such a situation. 
 
In fact, the substitution pattern of the PODS Passenger Choice Model 
reflects the correlation between the Y and B fare class alternatives offered by the 
same carrier, airline 2. This substitution pattern reflects the underlying 
assumption that the utility of a Y and a B fare class on the same airline are 
correlated as they share some common elements associated with airline 2 
characteristics like for instance the value a passenger gives to his preference for 
traveling on a particular airline. As a result, such a substitution pattern violates 
the logit fundamental assumption of independence in error terms across 
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alternatives. We will see in the next section how a nested logit model is able to 
accommodate such correlation and substitution patterns. 
 
3.5.2. PODS and the GEV Family of Models 
 
As shown in Chapter 2, the GEV family is a class of models that enables 
the researcher to accommodate more complex substitution patterns than the logit 
model and keeps part of the mathematical simplicity of logit, especially a closed-
form expression for the choice probabilities. The most widely used GEV family 
model is the nested logit model described in Chapter 2. Let us examine the 
relationship between the nested logit model and the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model. 
 
The nested logit model takes into account the correlation between the 
utilities of some alternatives by grouping them into nests. In the nested logit 
model, correlation is allowed between alternatives that belong to the same nest 
but not between alternatives that belong to different nests. Referring to the 
example above, the nested logit model could accommodate such a correlation 
pattern by grouping into a nest the Y and B fare class alternatives offered by 
airline 2. However, this example is only a partial description of the complex 
substitution/correlation pattern that exists in PODS. Indeed, the passenger 
choice problem in PODS implies a three-dimensional choice situation: the choice 
of an airline, a flight schedule and a fare class. Some correlation might exist 
between two fare classes on the same flight offered by the same airline and they 
should be grouped into a nest but there might also be some correlation between 
two different flights of the same airline for the same fare class. So they also 
should be grouped into another nest. If a travel alternative can belong to only 
one nest, it is then impossible to represent such a correlation/substitution 
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pattern. In the nested logit model, alternatives belong only to a single nest so the 
nested logit model is not able to accommodate the complexity of the choice 
situation modeled in PODS, which involves more complex correlation patterns.  
 
In fact, the nested logit model requires the researcher to establish a 
hierarchy between the various levels of the choice problem and only select 
correlation patterns are allowed at the lower level of the hierarchy that can be 
symbolized by a tree like in Chapter 2. Independence is assumed between nests 
at all nodes at the upper level of the tree. In PODS, no hierarchy is assumed 
between the three levels of the passenger choice problem: passengers do not 
choose an airline first and then a flight schedule and then a fare class. In PODS, 
correlation might exist between the utility of any combination of alternatives. As 
a result, a nested logit approach is not adapted to represent the passenger choice 
problem as it is modeled in PODS. 
 
In addition, if the GEV family of models is able to accommodate more 
complex substitution patterns than the logit model, it cannot accommodate 
random taste variation and all coefficients of a decision-maker utility have also to 
remain constant. Only more flexible models like the mixed logit model can 
accommodate random coefficients to represent the heterogeneity in response in 
the population to some elements of the decision-maker utility. Let us then 
examine the relationship between the PODS Passenger Choice Model and mixed 
logit models. 
 
3.5.3. PODS and Mixed Logit Models 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, mixed logit models are a highly 
flexible class of discrete choice models. They can accommodate any form of 
 62
substitution patterns and are particularly amenable to incorporate random taste 
variation. Mixed logit models are defined on the basis of the functional form of 
the choice probabilities: mixed logit choice probabilities are the integral of 
standard logit probabilities over a density of parameters. Using a mixed logit 
specification to represent random taste variation is straightforward. The utility 
specification is the same as for standard logit except that the parameters are 
supposed to vary across decision-makers rather than being fixed (the parameters 
are random variables). The researcher has then to specify a distribution for each 
coefficient of the systematic utility and estimate the parameters of this 
distribution. 
 
In the case of the PODS Passenger Choice Model, as already mentioned all 
disutility costs are assumed to be normally distributed except for the fare 
coefficient that is specified to be fixed. In addition, all the disutility costs are 
assumed to be independent. As a result, the joint distribution of all disutility 
costs is the product of six normal distributions. Then, to turn the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model into a mixed logit specification only requires that the 
utility of each alternative given the disutility costs take a standard logit form. 
This is achieved if an iid extreme value term is added to the utility of each 
alternative. However, as already mentioned in Chapter 2, by scaling up the 
utilities appropriately, the researcher can ensure that adding an extreme value 
term to the true utility will never change the outcome of the choice process for 
any decision-maker or air traveler. 
 
As a result, the PODS Passenger Choice Model can be considered as the 
equivalent of a mixed logit model with the mixing distribution equal to the 
product of six independent normal distributions, one for each of the disutility 
cost coefficients. As the disutility cost distributions depend on the passenger type 
and the basefare of each O-D market, the current PODS Passenger Choice Model 
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can in network D be approximated by 964 mixed logit choice models (482 O-D 
markets, two passenger types per market). 
 
The PODS Passenger Choice Model can then be approximated by a set of 
mixed logit models. This result is consistent with the fact that mixed logit choice 
models can approximate any utility maximizing model: as already mentioned, 
the PODS Passenger Choice Model is actually a utility maximizing model. The 
use of a mixed logit model to approximate the PODS Passenger Choice Model is 
especially straightforward as mixed logit models are extremely convenient for 
random coefficient choice problems like the passenger choice problem modeled 
in PODS. 
 
3.6.  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have described first the general architecture of the 
PODS simulator and then in detail one of its four major components, the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model. Finally, we have shown the similarities and differences 
between the choice model used in PODS and the models generally found in the 
consumer choice theory literature. Combined with Chapter 2, we have provided 
in this chapter a general framework to understand the PODS Passenger Choice 
Model as a whole and establish that it can be approximated by a series of mixed 
logit models with a random coefficient specification. In the next two chapters, we 
will focus in more detail on one of the component of the Passenger Choice 
Model: How passenger preference for flight schedules is modeled in PODS. In a 
first part, we will concentrate on a more detailed description of the decision 
window model used in PODS and compare it to alternative solutions found in 
the literature. In a second step, we will use the simulator to test the impact of 
alternative approaches to model passenger preference for schedule in PODS. 
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Chapter 4  Passenger Preference for Schedule 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters, we have described the general structure of the 
PODS Passenger Choice Model and its relationship with the discrete choice 
models found in the consumer choice theory literature. In this chapter, we are 
going to focus in more detail on how passenger preference for schedule is 
modeled in PODS and compare the PODS approach to the literature on traveler 
preference for schedule.  
 
The development of low-cost competition in the United States and Europe 
in the recent years has become a growing challenge for full-service network 
carriers. As a result, network carriers need to focus on their strengths including 
network coverage and frequency of service. These industry trends have raised 
the interest for a review of how preference for schedule is modeled in PODS and 
an investigation of the impact of schedule asymmetry on PODS simulation 
results. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, we will review the literature on how to 
model preference for schedule in inter-city travel in general and air 
transportation in particular. In the subsequent section, we will take a closer look 
at how preference for schedule is modeled in PODS including a more detailed 
description of the Boeing Decision Window Model with its strengths and 
shortcomings. Based on the literature review and the current PODS approach, we 
will finally propose alternative approaches to model passenger preference for 
schedule in PODS. 
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4.2. Passenger Preference for Schedule: Literature Review 
 
The demand for air travel is a derived demand that reflects travelers’ need 
to participate in activities at their destination. As a result, the scheduling of these 
activities determine to a great extent a traveler’s preferred departure and arrival 
time. All else being equal, a passenger will choose the flight departure that offers 
the best solution to his own individual time-space problem, i.e. participate to 
some activities at his destination. From an airline perspective, the objective is to 
design a flight schedule that accommodates the departure time preferences of the 
largest possible number of travelers based on the distribution of demand by time 
of the day observed in each market subject to some constraints like for instance 
the size of their fleet or aircraft rotations. Schedule convenience is an essential 
part of the choice by potential passengers of a particular air travel itinerary and 
the models used to represent passenger preference for schedule are an essential 
component of any attempt to simulate air traveler choice among various travel 
alternatives. 
 
The review of the literature on passenger preference for schedule in the air 
travel industry reveals two different approaches to model schedule convenience: 
the schedule delay vs. the decision window models. In the air travel literature, 
schedule delay has been defined as a measure of schedule convenience related to 
the difference between a passenger ideal departure time and his actual flight 
departure time (Douglas and Miller, 1974). A similar concept has been used in 
empirical studies to estimate travelers’ sensitivity to the average time between 
scheduled departures (Morrison and Winston, 1985, 1986).  
 
On the other hand, another approach found in the literature challenges the 
assumption that air travelers may have a unique ideal departure time. Flexibility 
in the schedule of their activities at destination implies that a range of departure 
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times is a convenient solution to their time-space problem. This approach has 
been developed by the Boeing Airplane Company in the Boeing Decision 
Window Model (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, 1997). According to 
Boeing research on passenger behavior, each individual air traveler does not 
have a single ideal departure time but a decision window. The passenger 
decision window represents the time frame that the traveler considers 
convenient for travel. It is bounded by the passenger earliest convenient 
departure time and latest convenient arrival time.  Any flight schedule that fits 
entirely within the decision window is equivalent to the air traveler from a 
scheduling point of view. Before describing in more detail in the next section the 
Boeing Decision Window Model and its influence on how passenger preference 
for schedule is modeled in PODS, let us examine how passenger preference to 
schedule is applied in two recent studies on passenger choice in air 
transportation. 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 2, Prossaloglou and Koppelman (1999) 
investigate the choice of a carrier, a flight and a fare-class. Based on stated 
preference data collected through a survey, they use a logit model to estimate the 
impact of several factors like fare or carrier identity on the selection of a 
particular travel alternative by individual air travelers. For more detail about the 
general framework and results of their study, the reader is referred to Chapter 2, 
Section 5.  
 
Regarding more specifically the choice of a flight schedule, the authors use 
a schedule delay approach and include a schedule delay variable in the 
passenger utility function. They tested first a linear schedule delay model where 
the schedule delay is equal to the difference between a passenger ideal departure 
time obtained from the survey and the actual flight departure time. Their 
findings indicate that business travelers are more reluctant to deviate from their 
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ideal departure time than leisure travelers. The difference in the schedule delay 
coefficient by trip purpose reflects business travelers’ expected greater sensitivity 
to schedule delay. Based on the values of the fare and schedule delay coefficients 
included in the model, they estimated that the average values of one hour of 
schedule delay were $60 and $17 for business and leisure travelers respectively. 
These findings support the usual segmentation of air travel demand between 
time-sensitive business travelers and less time-sensitive leisure travelers.  
 
In addition, they further explored traveler’s sensitivity to schedule delay 
by using more complex non-linear formulations of the schedule delay function. 
Under this more complex approach, they collected data for each passenger on 
both an ideal departure time and a decision window representing non-ideal but 
convenient and acceptable departure times. As expected, these models indicate a 
greater sensitivity to schedule delays associated with flights that depart outside 
the decision window, suggesting a non-linear sensitivity to schedule delays.  
 
In his doctoral dissertation, Mehndiratta (1996) studies the impact of time 
of day preferences on the scheduling of business trips in the domestic US 
focusing mainly on trips involving air transportation. His study includes an 
exploratory survey of recent business trips by a small group of ten San-Francisco 
based professionals. One of the conclusions from the interviews with these 
business travelers is that there was always a flight that fulfilled their travel 
schedule preferences, even in markets where only a few travel alternatives were 
available, sometimes only a single non-stop flight. That suggests that business 
travelers adapt their travel plans to the travel schedules offered by the airlines 
and supports the assumption that air travelers do not have a specific ideal 
departure time but a range of preferred travel times. Most of the business 
travelers included in this sample actually had some flexibility in the design of 
their schedule at their destination. Mehndiratta states that “there was substantial 
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evidence suggesting that supply and destination related constraints were non-
binding in a majority of cases”. In addition, when asked to state when they 
would have preferred to depart under ideal circumstances, most respondents 
reported times close to the times when flights were actually scheduled. These 
results support the decision window concept: Most business travelers do not 
have in mind a unique ideal departure time but a range of convenient travel 
schedules reflecting their ability to adapt their schedule at destination to the 
flight schedules offered by the airlines. In that perspective, each traveler decision 
window can be viewed as the result of the passenger time preferences mitigated 
by his time constraints like flying time, meeting schedule at destination. The time 
decision window can be viewed as the traveling schedule that minimizes the 
disutility associated with the disruption of the traveler’s regular schedule under 
some constraints (work schedule at destination etc.) 
 
In addition, Mehndiratta focuses in his work on the difference between 
the valuation of time across different periods of the day. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 2, he divided a regular 24-hour schedule into three periods: work, 
leisure and sleep time. He proposed and formulated a theory to accommodate 
variations in the value of time among these three periods of the day. His work 
suggests that deviating from the passenger decision window can be costly to the 
traveler, especially if this involves a disruption of some activities like sleeping or 
spending leisure time at home. This suggests that time matters and that different 
travel alternatives outside the decision window are very unlikely to be 
equivalent to the business traveler from a scheduling point of view. This study 
could have several implications on how we can view preference for schedule in 
PODS. But before discussing the impact of Mehndiratta’s results on the approach 
to scheduling in PODS, let us describe in the next section in more detail the 
current approach to schedule convenience in PODS.  
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4.3. Passenger Preference for Schedule in PODS 
 
4.3.1. The Boeing Decision Window Model 
 
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the PODS Passenger Choice Model 
has been developed as an extension of the Boeing Decision Window Model. As a 
result, the approach used in PODS to model passenger preference for schedule is 
directly inspired by the options developed in the Boeing Decision Window 
Model. Before coming back to the PODS Passenger Choice Model and its 
schedule component, let us then first examine in more detail its foundations, i.e. 
the Boeing Decision Window Model. This section is based on Decision Window 
Path Preference Methodology Description, The Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 
(1997). 
 
The Decision Window Model was developed at Boeing originally as a 
scheduling decision support tool for the airlines. The objective of the Decision 
Window Model is to assist an airline in designing attractive schedules in a 
particular origin-destination market in order to maximize market coverage and 
market share. Thanks to the Decision Window Model, airlines can assess the 
potential impact of alternative schedules on their own and competitor’s loads. 
This tool is designed to help airlines build schedules that are attractive to the 
demand and increase the number of people considering traveling (market 
coverage) and their own market share. 
 
As a result, to determine each airline market share, the Decision Window 
Model requires modeling the choice of individual passengers among various 
travel alternatives or paths based primarily on one characteristic: the schedule of 
each path. The approach used by Boeing to model this choice process is based on 
the concept of a decision window. As already mentioned, each passenger gets 
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assigned a decision window that represents his range of convenient travel times, 
given his own time-space problem. In designing the decision window model, 
Boeing modelers assumed that individual passengers do not have in mind a 
single ideal departure time to fulfill their travel needs but that a range of travel 
times are convenient to them thanks to some flexibility in their schedule plans at 
their destination. As a result, any path that wholly fits within a passenger 
decision window is equally attractive to the passenger from a solely schedule 
perspective. 
 
The first step of the model is then to define for each passenger a decision 
window. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, a decision window is characterized 
by two parameters: its width and its location. The width of a decision window is 
the sum of the minimum travel time in the market and a random element called 
the schedule tolerance. Schedule tolerance represents the amount of flexibility a 
traveler has. The value of the schedule tolerance is defined randomly for each 
single traveler and varies from one passenger to the next but depends on the 
market stage length and the passenger trip purpose. Indeed, decision windows 
are on average shorter for business travelers than for leisure travelers to 
reproduce the emphasis people traveling on business place on time and 
schedule. In addition, schedule tolerance is smaller in short-haul markets than in 
long-haul markets. The location of the decision window is defined such as to 
reproduce the typical demand distribution during the day in every market with 
for instance the usual peaks in demand in the morning and late afternoon. 
  
The second step of the model is to define each passenger choice set. Only 
paths that fit completely within the boundaries of a passenger decision window 
will be considered and included in the passenger choice set. In addition, only the 
best service for each airline is included in the passenger choice set. For instance, 
if airline A has two paths that fit within the passenger decision window, one 
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non-stop path and one connecting path, only the non-stop path will be included 
in the passenger choice set as the model assumes that the passenger will always 
choose that path as they are equivalent from a schedule perspective but the non-
stop service is preferred from a path quality point of view. Then, the last step of 
the model is the decision rule and the passenger choice. There are three cases: 
 
• No path fits within the passenger decision window. The passenger 
must then re-plan his trip: a new decision window will be generated 
and a new decision process will be initiated 
• If only one path fits within the passenger decision window, the 
passenger will choose that path 
• If several paths fit within the decision window and are then equally 
attractive to the passenger from a schedule perspective, the passenger 
will select a path based on the carrier identity and the quality of the 
path. For more information about this choice process, the reader is 
referred to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (1997) 
 
After this description of the Decision Window Model, let us now examine 
the similarities and differences between the Boeing Model and the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model focusing in particular on the approach to passenger 
preference for schedule. 
 
4.3.2.  Comparative Analysis of the PODS Passenger Choice and the 
Decision Window Models 
 
The PODS Passenger Choice Model is an extension of the Boeing Decision 
Window Model: It shares a large number of similarities with the Boeing Model. 
However, additional elements beyond schedule convenience, path quality and 
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airline identity are taken into account in PODS like for instance fare and fare 
class restrictions. In addition, the PODS Passenger Choice Model uses at the last 
step a utility-maximizing decision rule based on the calculation for each path of a 
generalized cost.  
 
But strictly from a schedule perspective, there is one fundamental 
difference between the Boeing Decision Window Model and PODS. This 
difference involves the definition of the passenger choice set. In the Boeing 
Decision Window Model, only paths that fit within the passenger decision 
window are included in the choice set and if there is none, a new decision 
window is defined and only paths that fit within this new window are 
considered. In PODS, all paths are included in the passenger choice set, whether 
or not they fit into the passenger decision window and the difference between 
the paths inside the decision window and outside the decision window is the 
replanning disutility. For more information on replanning disutilities, see 
Chapter 3. 
 
As a result, in both the Boeing Decision Window Model and PODS, all 
paths that fit within a passenger decision window are equally attractive from a 
schedule point of view. However, in PODS, all paths that do not fit within a 
passenger decision window are also equally attractive to the passenger from a 
schedule perspective. The replanning disutility is the same for all paths outside 
the decision window whatever their position might be, whether there is a slight 
violation of the decision window boundaries or the path is completely outside 
the decision window. In the Boeing Decision Window Model, paths outside a 
passenger decision window are only considered if no path fits within a passenger 
initial decision window and the passenger needs to re-plan. Even, when 
replanning occurs, all paths are not considered equally schedule-attractive as 
only paths that fit within the new decision window are now considered. 
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 Both the PODS and the Boeing Decision Window Model approaches 
might have drawbacks: The Decision Window Model approach is justified within 
the objectives of this model that focuses mainly on the influence of airline 
scheduling decisions on airline market share. However, it might not be 
appropriate within the PODS framework that goes beyond dealing only with 
airline scheduling decisions and is focused on airline revenue management 
decisions and takes into consideration additional elements of the passenger 
choice problem, especially fare and fare class restrictions. As a result, it seems 
reasonable that passengers would consider paths that do not fit within the 
boundaries of their original schedule plans if they are associated with some other 
substantial benefits like a lower fare or fewer restrictions.  
 
In PODS, additional paths that do not fit wholly within a passenger 
decision window should then be included in a passenger choice set. However, it 
might not be reasonable to assume that the schedule of all paths outside the 
decision window is equally attractive to the air traveler. The approach currently 
used in PODS, which we will call the constant replanning disutility model might 
lead to some unrealistic decisions, especially for business travelers that are 
assumed to be more time-sensitive than leisure travelers.  
  
For instance, it seems really unlikely that a business traveler that needs to 
travel in the morning, attend a meeting in the destination city during the day and 
come back in the evening would accept an evening departure. He might just 
decide not to travel at all if no path is available in the morning. In addition, it is 
also unlikely that such a business passenger would give the same value to a 
midday and evening departure. This problem is much more an issue for business 
travelers that have short decision windows and put a lot of emphasis on 
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schedule convenience than for leisure travelers, which have wider decision 
windows that might cover in some cases the entire length of the day. 
 
In fact, under the current PODS approach, because passengers consider all 
paths that are both inside and outside their decision windows, it can happen that 
a business traveler with a 6 a.m.-12 p.m. decision window prefers a B fare on an 
evening flight completely outside its decision window over a Y fare on the 
morning flight that would fit into it because the fare difference is higher than the 
sum of the restriction and replanning disutilities.  
 
For instance, let us consider a business passenger willing to pay the Y fare 
(under the current PODS default settings, 93% of business passengers are willing 
to do so) and that has the following choice set: either a Y fare on the morning 
non-stop path that fits into his decision window or a B and Y fare on an evening 
non-stop flight outside his decision window. Both paths are operated by the 
same airline. The passenger will never choose the Y/evening combination as the 
cost of this path/class is always higher than the Y/morning path/class. As a 
result, his choice set is reduced to the following alternatives: Y/morning or 
B/evening. Under the current PODS design, the probability of choosing the 
B/evening path/class is between 10 and 15% for values of the market Q fare 
varying between $85 and $268 (Q fares in PODS network D and E are within that 
range in most markets). Such a figure might seem too high and unrealistic for a 
path that is located completely outside a passenger decision window but also too 
low for a path that deviates hardly from one of the decision window boundaries. 
 
As a result, the constant replanning disutility model currently used in 
PODS might under-estimate the importance of schedule convenience, especially 
for business travelers. However, before going further into designing and testing 
alternatives to the constant replanning disutility model, let us examine the 
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potential impact of schedule convenience on PODS simulation results. In order to 
assess the importance of passenger preference for schedule in PODS, let us do a 
sensitivity analysis of PODS simulation results with regard to the level of the 
replanning disutility for both business and leisure passengers 
 
4.3.3.  Sensitivity Analysis of PODS Simulation Results  
 
 In order to evaluate the impact of the schedule component of the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model on simulation results, let us do a sensitivity analysis of 
PODS results with regard to the value of the replanning disutility. For this 
analysis, we will consider both the schedule-symmetric Network D and the more 
schedule-asymmetric international alliance Network E. For a more complete 
description of the network characteristics, the reader is referred to Chapter 3. 
However, as a reminder, airline 1 has a small schedule advantage over its 
competitor in symmetric Network D thanks to a better geographical location of 
its hub with regard to the bulk of traffic flows. In less symmetric Network E, 
airline 1 has a large schedule advantage over its US competitor thanks to a wider 
schedule coverage.  
 
For both networks, we will vary the replanning disutility from 0 to 200% 
of the current base replanning disutility with 25% increments. In addition, we 
also tested an extremely high replanning disutility called here the infinite case: 
under this assumption, like in the original Boeing Decision Window Model, only 
paths that fit within a passenger decision window are considered. The cost of all 
paths outside the decision window is so high that a potential passenger will 
never choose such a path, except if there are no paths in his choice set that fit in 
his decision window. Figures 4.1. and 4.2. below show the results of the PODS 
simulations carried out for this sensitivity study. 
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The simulation results reveal common characteristics for both networks: 
in both Network D and E, a decrease in the value of the replanning disutility 
leads to a decrease in revenues for the schedule dominant airline and an increase 
in revenues for other airlines. Similarly, an increase in the value of the 
replanning disutility leads to an increase in revenues for the schedule dominant 
airline and a decrease for the other carriers. This is consistent with our 
expectations as the schedule advantage of an airline has more impact as the 
influence of schedule convenience on passenger choice increases. When all 
replanning disutilities are set to 0 and schedule convenience is supposed to have 
no impact on passenger choice, airline revenues tend to converge if all airlines 
use the same revenue management method. 
 
However, the impact of a variation in the replanning disutility is much 
greater in schedule-asymmetric network E than in schedule-symmetric network 
D. While significant, the impact of a change in replanning disutility value on 
airline revenues remain relatively limited in network D. However, the level of 
the replanning disutility has a dramatic impact on airline revenues in the more 
complex and less symmetric network E. Its impact is multiplied by at least a 
factor of 3 compared to network D. 
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Figure 4.1. : Sensitivity of airline revenues w.r.t. replanning disutility in 
PODS Network D 
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Figure 4.2. : Sensitivity of airline revenues w.r.t. replanning disutility in 
PODS Network E 
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Similarly, Figures 4.3. and 4.4. show that varying the replanning disutility 
has a different impact on load factors in Network D and E. In Network D, 
changes in load factor are relatively limited for both airlines: If the replanning 
disutility is very low, the schedules offered by both carriers are more attractive to 
passengers, load factors are higher and are similar for both airlines. However, 
when schedule convenience has more impact on passenger choice, airline 1 load 
factor starts increasing and becomes higher than airline 2 load factor due to the 
slight schedule advantage related to the geographical location of airline 1 hub. 
 
In network E, if we set the replanning disutility to zero, airline 2 has a 
much higher load factor as it is as attractive as airline 1 from a schedule 
perspective but offers less capacity as aircraft capacity has been initially 
calibrated based on the base value of the replanning disutility and not on a zero 
replanning disutility. However, as passengers give a higher value to schedule 
convenience and the replanning disutility increases, airline 1 and 2 load factors 
follow two very different patterns: airline 1 load factor increases rapidly thanks 
to its attractiveness to schedule-conscious travelers due to its wider schedule 
coverage and airline 2 load factor decreases rapidly. Airline 3 and 4 load factors 
experience more moderate change that can be mainly explained by the evolution 
of their US codeshare partner load factor. 
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Figure 4.3. : Sensitivity of airline load factor w.r.t. replanning disutility in 
PODS Network D 
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Figure 4.4. : Sensitivity of airline load factor w.r.t. replanning disutility in 
PODS Network E 
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To get a better understanding of the differences between Network D and 
E, let us examine the revenue per category figures. In PODS, we collect data, on 
passenger choice behavior when their initial most preferred travel alternative is 
no longer available. These data are called actual choice given first choice data. 
The first choice of a passenger is defined as the alternative with the lowest 
generalized cost that meets the passenger willingness to pay and the advance 
purchase requirements. If this alternative is available, we say that the passenger 
got his first choice satisfied. If it is not available due to the revenue management 
controls, the passenger has the four following options: Travel on the same path 
but on a higher fare class  (sell-up), travel on the same airline but on a different 
path (recapture), travel on another airline (spill) or decide not to travel at all. 
 
Unlike in the real world, since PODS is a simulation of a booking process, 
it is possible to track passenger behavior when denied booking of their first 
choice. As a result, it is possible to calculate in PODS the proportion of revenues 
that comes from passengers that had their first choice satisfied or were denied 
booking. We divide the airline total revenues into the following four categories: 
 
• First choice revenues are revenues from all passengers that had their first 
choice satisfied 
• Sell-up revenues are revenues from passengers that were denied booking of 
their first choice and decided to sell-up to a higher fare class on the same path 
• Recapture revenues are revenues from passengers that were denied booking 
of their first choice and decided to shift to another path of the same airline 
• Spill-in are revenues from passengers that were denied booking of their first 
choice on another airline and decided to shift to a path offered by this airline 
 
Figures 4.5. to 4.8. display the revenues by category for the two airlines 
competing in PODS Network D: 
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Figure 4.5. : First choice revenues in Network D 
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Figure 4.6. : Sell-up revenues in Network D 
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Figure 4.7. : Recapture revenues in Network D 
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 Figure 4.8. : Spill-in revenues in Network D 
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In PODS Network D, three categories of revenue follow a similar pattern 
for both airlines when the replanning disutility varies. As the replanning 
disutility increases and passengers tend to give a higher value to schedule 
convenience, sell-up and spill-in revenues increase as more passengers are 
willing to shift to a more expensive fare class or a different airline to select a path 
that fits within their decision window. On the contrary, more passengers are 
reluctant to shift to another path of the same airline as such paths might be 
located outside their decision window and recapture revenues decrease. 
 
However, for the largest revenue category, first choice revenues, the 
replanning disutility sensitivity analysis reveals different patterns: First choice 
revenues increase with the replanning disutility for airline 1 but decrease for 
airline 2. As the replanning disutility increases and represents a higher 
proportion of a path/class generalized cost, some additional passengers will 
have airline 1 as their first choice thanks to his slight schedule advantage: For 
some passengers, airline 1 will be the only one for which a path is located within 
their decision window and a convenient schedule becomes more important as 
the replanning disutility increases. For those passengers, it is less and less likely 
for airline 2 to be their first choice as airline 1 better schedule can less and less be 
compensated by some other elements like path quality or the premium 
associated with a path on a passenger favorite airline. 
 
However, Figures 4.9. to 4.12. show that the evolution of revenues by 
category is very different in PODS network E: 
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Figure 4.9. : First choice revenues in Network E 
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Figure 4.10. : Sell-up revenues in Network E 
 
 85
$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
$300,000
$350,000
$400,000
$450,000
$500,000
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% Infinite
% of Base Replanning Disutility
Airline 1 
Airline 2 
Airline 3 
Airline 4 
 
Figure 4.11. : Recapture revenues in Network E 
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Figure 4.12. : Spill-in revenues in Network E 
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The evolution of the revenue per category figures reveal in Network E the 
impact of the replanning disutility on the choice of passengers in the presence of 
a significant asymmetry between the schedules offered by the competing airlines. 
The sensitivity of revenues in each category is very much driven by the impact of 
schedule asymmetry.  
 
 For airline 1, as in Network D, first choice revenues initially increase 
slightly as the replanning disutility increases. However, as the replanning 
disutility becomes larger, more and more passengers prefer to travel on airline 1 
that offers the most convenient schedule. Faced with a very high demand, airline 
1 load factor starts to increase sharply and the airline has less and less space 
available to accommodate the demand. As a result, a higher proportion of 
passengers do not get their first choice satisfied and  first choice revenues start to 
decrease. Recapture and sell-up revenues increase sharply as the airline is faced 
with very high demand and cannot satisfy the first choice requirements of many 
passengers: A significant proportion of them accept to shift to a higher fare class 
on the same path or to another airline 1 path that might also be located in their 
decision window. However, some also get spilled to the competitor and this 
explains the large increase in airline 2 spill-in revenues. 
 
For airline 2, first choice revenues decrease sharply. As schedule 
convenience becomes more important, less and less passengers are willing to 
travel on a path located outside their decision window and so less and less 
passengers consider airline 2 as their first choice since it has a shorter schedule 
coverage and offers paths that fit within the decision window for fewer 
passengers than airline 1. In addition, for very few passengers, airline 2 offers 
several paths that fit in their decision window and as a result, recapture revenues 
also decrease. 
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For airline 3 and 4, the revenue per category figures display a more stable 
pattern and their evolution is combination of both the forces described in the 
PODS network D case and the influence of their US codeshare partners. For 
instance, due to the lack of attractiveness of its US partner, airline 4 first choice 
revenues tend to decrease but airline 3 first choice revenues remains more stable. 
Similarly, airline 4 spill-in revenues tend to increase like for airline 2 and airline 3 
recapture revenues tend to grow following the pattern observed for its US 
codeshare partners. 
 
To conclude, the results of this sensitivity analysis show the large impact 
of the replanning disutility and how to value schedule convenience in the 
presence of a significant schedule asymmetry. As a result, the approach used to 
model schedule convenience in the Passenger Choice Model is an important 
factor that needs to be considered if PODS is to be used to study the impact of 
asymmetry in general and schedule asymmetry in particular. In order to study 
the impact of schedule asymmetry in PODS, the drawbacks of the constant 
replanning disutility model should be addressed and alternative models should 
be developed and tested.  
 
4.4.  Alternative approaches to Passenger Preference for Schedule 
in PODS 
  
 To design a new approach to passenger preference for schedule, we will 
restrict our analysis in this section within the limits of the schedule delay and 
decision window concepts as these are the two approaches found in the air 
transportation literature that have been applied in research on passenger 
preference for schedule in the past. 
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4.4.1. Decision window vs. Schedule delay? 
 
Within this framework, our first option could be to design an approach 
based entirely on the concept of schedule delay without any reference to a 
decision window. Under such an approach, instead of a decision window, each 
passenger would get assigned a unique ideal departure time. The ideal departure 
time would be assigned randomly for each passenger but would be designed 
such as to reproduce a pre-determined typical time of day distribution of air 
travel demand in each market. A disutility cost would be added to the cost of 
each path based on the difference between the actual path departure time and 
the ideal departure time of the passenger. This disutility cost could be a linear or 
non-linear function of the difference between actual and ideal departure time 
and would vary based on trip purpose and market stage length.  
 
However, even if such an approach could be implemented in PODS, it 
does not seem very attractive. As already stated, we believe that most air 
travelers have some flexibility in the schedule of their activities at their 
destination and that a single ideal departure time does not exist for most 
passengers. Most passengers have in mind a range of acceptable travel times that 
is a convenient solution to their time-space problem. In addition, the results of 
the exploratory survey carried out by Mehndiratta supports the concept of a 
decision window. As a result, we will prefer alternative approaches that remain 
based on the decision window concept and are not solely based on a schedule 
delay approach. 
 
An alternative to the PODS approach to passenger preference for schedule 
would be to keep the current decision window model but to modify the 
passenger choice set. Under that approach, like in the initial Boeing Decision 
Window Model, only paths that fit entirely within a passenger decision window 
 89
would be considered and included in the passenger choice set. All paths outside 
the passenger decision window would be excluded. If there were no paths 
included in his decision window, the passenger would need to re-plan and 
would be assigned a second decision window and would pick among the 
available paths that fit into that new window and satisfy the passenger 
willingness to pay requirements.   
 
However, as already mentioned in the previous section, such an option 
might not be appropriate as the purpose of the PODS Passenger Choice Model is 
to represent the decision process of individual air travelers faced with multiple 
trade-offs like for instance between fare and schedule convenience. Such a 
solution, which gives a primary role to schedule convenience in passenger choice 
and is close to an infinite replanning disutility model could lead to major 
counter-intuitive effects.  
 
For instance, with the introduction of asymmetric schedules in PODS, 
such a solution might overestimate the competitive advantage of the carrier 
offering the best schedule. The definition of short decision windows for business 
travelers to reproduce the high value they place on schedule convenience would 
lead some of them to select the schedule-dominant and only carrier that offer a 
flight schedule that fits within their decision window without considering 
alternative paths offered by competing carriers that do not fit in the decision 
window but do not deviate largely from it. This might lead to an over-estimation 
of passenger preference for the carrier that offers the most convenient schedule 
to a large number of business travelers.  
  
 As a result, our preferred approach draws on the advantages of both the 
decision window and the schedule delay approaches. As in the current PODS 
Passenger Choice Model, a decision window would be defined for each 
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passenger and all path/classes that fit into the window would be equivalent to 
the air traveler from a schedule point of view. However, unlike under the current 
constant replanning disutility model, path/classes that do not fit in the decision 
window would not be equally attractive to the passenger anymore. This would 
be obtained through a variable replanning disutility approach. Similar to a 
schedule delay model, the replanning disutility of each path would vary based 
on its deviation from the passenger decision window.  
 
 The behavioral assumption is that passengers have some flexibility in their 
schedule plans at destination and this is reflected through their decision window, 
but beyond this initial flexibility, any deviation from their original plans comes at 
a cost and induces an inconvenience to the passenger modeled through the 
replanning disutility. In addition, this inconvenience is growing with the 
deviation of the path schedule with regard to their initial plans or decision 
window: The replanning disutility is then a function of the deviation from the 
decision window. The next question is then: What should be the form of the 
replanning disutility function? 
 
 As already mentioned, Prossaloglou and Koppelman study suggests that 
the relationship between the cost to the passenger of the schedule inconvenience 
and the deviation from his initial schedule plans is non-linear. According to their 
research, the cost of schedule inconvenience is an increasing function of the 
deviation from the passenger ideal departure time. In addition, Mehndiratta 
study suggests that there exists a difference in the valuation of time by business 
travelers between different periods of the day like work, leisure and sleep time. 
This suggests that the replanning disutility of a path that does not fit within a 
passenger decision window depends on the amount of disruption it creates in 
the passenger usual work, leisure and sleep schedule. As a result, Mehndiratta 
work suggests that the value of the replanning disutility should be a piece-wise 
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linear function of the deviation from the decision window based on which part of 
the passenger schedule gets disrupted. 
 
4.4.2. The Variable Replanning Disutility Approach 
 
As mentioned in the last section, Mehndiratta study of the impact of time 
of the day effects on the demand for intercity travel suggests a piece-wise linear 
form for the replanning disutility function. The implementation in PODS is then 
based on that principle. The variable replanning disutility is equal to the product 
of a common base replanning disutility and a replanning disutility index that 
depends on the deviation of the path schedule from the passenger decision 
window. The base replanning disutility is equal to the current PODS replanning 
disutility described in Chapter 3 to keep, for the same deviation from the 
passenger decision window, the scale in the value of replanning disutilities 
across O-D markets established by Lee (2000). 
 
To allow for a high level of flexibility in the specification of various piece-
wise linear replanning disutility functions representing a wide range of possible 
passenger behavior patterns, each segment of the piece-wise linear function has 
only a one-hour duration. The value passengers give to the first hour of deviation 
from the decision window can be specified to be different from the value they 
give to the second hour of deviation, the third hour of deviation etc. As a result, 
for each passenger type, the replanning disutility index is then composed of 24 
input parameters, one for each incremental hourly deviation from the passenger 
decision window.  
 
In addition, the replanning disutility index is different for business and 
leisure passengers as numerous studies including the work of Prossaloglou and 
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Koppelman have shown that the two categories exhibit different behavioral 
patterns with regard to passenger preference for schedule. As a result, the 
difference between the value of the replanning disutility for a business and 
leisure traveler comes from the difference in the value of both the base 
replanning disutility and the replanning disutility index. 
 
The values of the replanning disutility function input parameters are 
designed to reproduce expected passenger behavior for both passenger types. As 
business passengers choose in PODS primarily between Y and B fares, the 
replanning disutility index is calibrated based on the proportion of business 
travelers that prefer a Y fare class itinerary inside their decision window to a B 
fare class itinerary outside their decision window all else being equal (same path 
quality and travel on the same airline). For leisure travelers, as they primarily 
selects Q and M fares, the replanning disutility is calibrated based on the 
proportion of passengers that prefer a M fare inside their decision window over a 
Q fare outside their decision window all else being equal. 
 
Tables 4.1. and 4.2. below describe one example of a replanning disutility 
index for respectively business and leisure passengers in a market with a $100 Q 
fare, $150 M fare, $200 B fare and $400 Y fare. In this market, the base average 
replanning disutility is equal to $61.56 for business passengers and 11% of them 
prefer a B fare outside their decision window over a Y fare inside their decision 
window, all else being equal. Similarly, the base average replanning disutility is 
$11.9 for leisure passengers and 94.3% of them prefer a Q fare outside their 
decision window over an M fare inside their decision window. 
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Hours of deviation Replanning Disutility % pax prefer B outside
1 $15.4 27.5%
2 $38.5 17.8%
3 $77.0 7.9%
4 $119.3 3.2%
5 $157.0 1.6%
6 $192.4 0.9%
7 $226.5 0.6%
8 $259.7 0.4%
9 $292.4 0.3%
10 $324.7 0.3%
11 $356.8 0.2%
12 $388.6 0.2%
13 $420.3 0.2%
14 $451.8 0.2%
15 $483.2 0.2%
16 $514.6 0.2%
17 $545.9 0.1%
18 $577.1 0.1%
19 $608.3 0.1%
20 $639.5 0.1%
21 $670.6 0.1%
22 $701.6 0.1%
23 $732.7 0.1%
24 $763.7 0.1%
 
Table 4.1. : Variable replanning disutility (business travelers) 
Hours of deviation Replanning Disutility % pax prefer B outside
1 $11.9 94.3%
2 $13.4 91.4%
3 $14.9 87.7%
4 $16.4 83.2%
5 $17.9 78.1%
6 $19.3 72.5%
7 $20.8 66.6%
8 $22.3 60.5%
9 $23.8 54.6%
10 $25.3 48.9%
11 $26.8 43.6%
12 $28.3 38.7%
13 $29.8 34.2%
14 $31.2 30.2%
15 $32.7 26.6%
16 $34.2 23.4%
17 $35.7 20.7%
18 $37.2 18.2%
19 $38.7 16.1%
20 $40.2 14.3%
21 $41.7 12.7%
22 $43.1 11.3%
23 $44.6 10.0%
24 $46.1 9.0%
 
Table 4.2. : Variable replanning disutility (leisure passengers) 
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Figure 4.13. describes the difference in expected passenger behavior 
between the initial constant replanning disutility and the new variable 
replanning disutility approaches 
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Figure 4.13. : Expected passenger behavior under the initial and new approach to 
passenger preference for schedule 
 
Finally, Figure 4.14. below describes the value of the replanning disutility 
under the two schemes for a business passenger with a decision window that 
spans from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.. 
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Figure 4.14. : Value of the replanning disutility for a business passenger with a  
9 a.m.-3 p.m. decision window  
 
As a result, the variable replanning disutility approach takes into account 
that if a passenger has a range of acceptable schedules that are equally attractive 
to him, unlike in the initial PODS design, everything outside that range is not 
equivalent and he does not give the same value to a path close to his schedule 
requirements and one that deviates largely from it. We expect the variable 
replanning disutility approach to have a greater impact on business travelers as 
they have shorter decision windows and more path/classes are likely to be 
outside their decision window. With such an approach, we are able to model the 
fact that business travelers might be extremely reluctant to accept path/classes 
that deviate largely from their desired schedule but might still consider flying on 
an airline that offers a better price/restriction value on a path that deviates only a 
little from the passenger decision window.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have examined how passenger preference for schedule 
is currently modeled in PODS and compared the PODS approach to the concepts 
found in the air transportation literature. Based on our analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the constant replanning disutility model used in PODS, we 
have defined an alternative, the variable replanning disutility model. 
 
In the next chapter, we will test the variable replanning disutility 
approach through PODS simulations. Based on simulation results, we will assess 
the impact of the variable replanning disutility models on PODS results in both a 
schedule-symmetric and a schedule-asymmetric environment. 
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Chapter 5  PODS Simulation Results 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, we have described a new alternative approach to 
model passenger preference for schedule in PODS called the variable replanning 
disutility model. In this chapter, we will use the simulator to test the impact of 
this approach on the revenue performance of airlines in a competitive 
environment. 
 
In particular, we will show how passenger preference for schedule affects 
some key airline performance characteristics like airline revenues and load 
factor. We will also study the differential impact of passenger preference for 
schedule in two different competitive environments, one called schedule-
symmetric where all competitor airlines offer similar schedules and one called 
schedule-asymmetric where the competing airlines differentiate themselves by 
offering different schedules. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2. is an explanation of the 
base case settings with an emphasis on some key inputs of the simulator. Section 
5.3. presents the simulation results of the new approach to model passenger 
preference for schedule in PODS, followed by a summary in section 5.4. 
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5.2. Simulation Set-up 
 
5.2.1. Base Case Settings 
 
Before presenting the results of PODS simulations, it is necessary to 
describe the base case used as a basis for comparison of all simulations 
performed for this thesis. Since the objective of this thesis is to understand 
preference for schedule in the airline industry and enhance how passenger 
preference for schedule is modeled in PODS, our base case will be the current 
approach to passenger preference for schedule in PODS described in Chapter 4 
and called the constant replanning disutility model. As a result, in the base case, 
a constant replanning disutility is added to the cost of all path/classes that do 
not fit entirely within a passenger decision window irrespective of the time 
position of the path relative to the passenger decision window. As described in 
Chapter 4, the value of the replanning disutility depends on trip purpose and the 
market basefare. 
 
5.2.2. Variable Replanning Disutility Functions 
 
In Chapter 4, we defined a new approach to passenger preference for 
schedule in PODS based on a variable replanning disutility. Under this model, 
the value of the replanning disutility added to the cost of every path located 
outside a passenger decision window depends on the position in time of the path 
relative to the decision window. As described in Chapter 4, the value of the 
replanning disutility is calibrated to represent expected passenger behavior for 
both business and leisure passengers. For business passengers (respectively 
leisure passengers), the value of the replanning disutility is calibrated based on 
the proportion of passengers that prefer a Y path/class (respectively a M 
path/class) inside their decision window over a B path/class (respectively a Q 
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path/class) outside their decision window, all else being equal. We will consider 
three alternatives, labeled low, medium and high for the value of passenger 
replanning disutilities. Tables 5.1. and 5.2. and Figures 5.1. and 5.2. describe the 
three levels of replanning disutility and the associated passenger preferences in a 
market with a lowest fare (Q fare) of $100. In addition, in order to isolate the 
contribution of each type of passenger to the change in airline revenue 
performance, we will consider in this chapter three simulation scenarios:  
 
• Scenario 1: The replanning disutility is constant for leisure passengers 
and variable for business passengers 
 
• Scenario 2: The replanning disutility is constant for business 
passengers and variable for leisure passengers 
 
• Scenario 3: The replanning disutility is variable for both types of 
passengers 
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  Low   Medium   High   
Hours of deviation Replanning Disutility % pax prefer B outside Replanning Disutility % pax prefer B outside Replanning Disutility % pax prefer B outside 
1       $15.4 27.5% $15.4 27.5% $15.4 27.5%
2       $30.8 20.7% $38.5 17.8% $53.9 12.9%
3       $51.3 13.6% $77.0 7.9% $97.5 5.1%
4       $77.0 7.9% $119.3 3.2% $150.1 1.8%
5       $110.8 3.8% $157.0 1.6% $193.9 0.9%
6       $143.6 2.0% $192.4 0.9% $233.4 0.6%
7       $167.1 1.4% $226.5 0.6% $270.4 0.4%
8       $184.7 1.0% $259.7 0.4% $305.9 0.3%
9       $198.4 0.9% $292.4 0.3% $340.3 0.3%
10       $209.3 0.8% $324.7 0.3% $374.0 0.2%
11       $218.3 0.7% $356.8 0.2% $407.1 0.2%
12       $225.7 0.6% $388.6 0.2% $439.9 0.2%
13       $232.0 0.6% $420.3 0.2% $472.4 0.2%
14       $237.4 0.6% $451.8 0.2% $504.6 0.2%
15       $242.1 0.5% $483.2 0.2% $536.6 0.1%
16       $246.2 0.5% $514.6 0.2% $568.5 0.1%
17       $249.9 0.5% $545.9 0.1% $600.2 0.1%
18       $253.1 0.5% $577.1 0.1% $631.8 0.1%
19       $256.0 0.5% $608.3 0.1% $663.4 0.1%
20       $258.6 0.5% $639.5 0.1% $694.9 0.1%
21       $260.9 0.4% $670.6 0.1% $726.3 0.1%
22       $263.0 0.4% $701.6 0.1% $757.6 0.1%
23       $265.0 0.4% $732.7 0.1% $788.9 0.1%
24       $266.8 0.4% $763.7 0.1% $820.2 0.1%
 
Table 5.1. : Variable replanning disutility (business travelers) 
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Figure 5.1. :  Expected passenger behavior under the constant and variable replanning disutility models (business 
passengers) 
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  Low   Medium   High   
Hours of deviation Replanning Disutility % pax prefer Q outside Replanning Disutility % pax prefer Q outside Replanning Disutility % pax prefer Q outside 
1       $3.0 99.8% $11.9 94.3% $11.9 94.3%
2       $4.5 99.6% $13.4 91.4% $13.4 91.4%
3       $6.0 99.3% $14.9 87.7% $14.9 87.7%
4       $7.4 98.8% $16.4 83.2% $16.4 83.2%
5       $8.9 97.8% $17.9 78.1% $17.9 78.1%
6       $10.4 96.4% $18.8 74.4% $19.3 72.5%
7       $11.9 94.3% $19.6 71.6% $20.8 66.6%
8       $13.4 91.4% $20.1 69.5% $22.3 60.5%
9       $14.5 88.6% $20.5 67.9% $23.8 54.6%
10       $15.5 86.0% $20.8 66.6% $25.3 48.9%
11       $16.2 83.7% $21.1 65.5% $26.8 43.6%
12       $16.9 81.6% $21.3 64.6% $28.3 38.7%
13       $17.4 79.7% $21.5 63.8% $29.8 34.2%
14       $17.9 78.1% $21.7 63.1% $31.2 30.2%
15       $18.2 76.6% $21.8 62.5% $32.7 26.6%
16       $18.6 75.3% $21.9 62.0% $34.2 23.4%
17       $18.9 74.2% $22.1 61.6% $35.7 20.7%
18       $19.2 73.1% $22.1 61.2% $37.2 18.2%
19       $19.4 72.2% $22.2 60.9% $38.7 16.1%
20       $19.6 71.3% $22.3 60.5% $40.2 14.3%
21       $19.8 70.5% $22.4 60.3% $41.7 12.7%
22       $20.0 69.8% $22.4 60.0% $43.1 11.3%
23       $20.2 69.2% $22.5 59.8% $44.6 10.0%
24       $20.3 68.6% $22.6 59.5% $46.1 9.0%
 
Table 5.2. : Variable replanning disutility (leisure travelers)  
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Figure 5.2. :  Expected Passenger behavior under the constant and variable replanning disutility models (leisure 
passengers) 
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5.2.3. Other PODS Inputs 
 
Apart from the replanning disutility, other major PODS inputs include 
other passenger preference inputs and forecasting, detruncation and revenue 
management method inputs. As the objective of this thesis is to model passenger 
preference for schedule in the airline industry and understand its impact on 
PODS simulation results, all these inputs will remain constant across all 
simulations. 
 
All other passenger preference inputs like restriction, path quality index 
and unfavorite airline disutility are equal to the settings described in Chapter 3. 
In addition, we will use the current default PODS detruncation and forecasting 
techniques, i.e. booking curve detruncation and pick-up forecasting methods. For 
a description of these methods, the reader is referred to Darot (2001). 
 
In addition, since revenue management is not the primary focus of this 
thesis, all airlines will use the standard Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) 
algorithm to control seat allocation among fare classes. EMSR was first 
introduced by Belobaba (1987) and has been used since then by a large number of 
airlines for seat allocation purposes. For a description of EMSR, the reader is also 
referred to Darot (2001). 
 
Finally, the simulations were performed in both “schedule-symmetric” 
Network D and “schedule-asymmetric” network E. For a description of these 
two network environments, the reader is referred to Chapter 3. The average load 
factor is equal to 83% and 80% in network D and E respectively. 
 
 105
5.3. Simulation Results 
 
 
5.3.1. Revenues 
 
Let us first look at the impact on airline revenues following the 
introduction of a variable replanning disutility in Network D and E.  
 
Network D 
 
Figures 5.3., 5.4. and 5.5. below show the change in airline revenues for the 
three simulation scenarios. 
 
First of all, the impact of switching from the current constant replanning 
disutility to the new variable disutility is much greater for business passengers  
(scenario 1) than for leisure passengers (scenario 2). This is expected since 
business and leisure passengers have different behavioral patterns with business 
passengers giving more emphasis to non-monetary elements like preference for 
schedule and leisure passengers’ decisions being more influenced by fare levels. 
In PODS, business passengers have on average a much higher replanning 
disutility than leisure passengers and the replanning disutility represents a 
higher proportion of the total cost of a path for business than for leisure 
passengers. As a result, we expect airline revenues to be more sensitive to a 
change in the way business passengers value preference for schedule. The 
introduction of a variable replanning disutility in PODS Network D can lead to 
change in revenues over 1% if this new valuation of passenger preference for 
schedule is introduced for business passengers only versus a maximum change 
in revenues of no more than 0.15% if it is used by leisure passengers only. 
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Figure 5.3. : % change in simulated airline revenues when business 
passengers only use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 1) 
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Figure 5.4. : % change in simulated airline revenues when leisure passengers 
only use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 2) 
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Figure 5.5. : % change in simulated airline revenues when both business and 
leisure passengers use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 3) 
 
In addition, simulation results also show that simulated airline revenues 
at the system level (sum of airline 1 and 2 revenues) tend to increase for all 
scenarios and all values of the replanning disutility. This increase in simulated 
total revenues for the industry is larger for the medium and large variable 
replanning disutility alternatives than for the low alternative. Table 5.3. below 
shows the change in revenues at the industry level in PODS Network D. The 
base case for this table is industry revenues with a constant replanning disutility 
model 
 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Low 0.33% 0.09% 0.50% 
Medium 0.61% 0.09% 0.83% 
High 0.70% 0.12% 1.09% 
 
Table 5.3. : % change in simulated airline revenues at the system level in 
Network D 
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As already stated in Chapter 4, the major drawback of the constant 
replanning disutility model is that the value of a path located outside a 
passenger decision window is independent of the time location of the path 
relative to the decision window. As a result, the constant replanning disutility 
model under-estimates the preference of a passenger for a path located close to 
his decision window but over-estimates his preference for a schedule-
inconvenient path located far outside his decision window. When a variable 
replanning disutility model is introduced, passengers become very reluctant to 
travel on schedule-inconvenient paths located far outside their decision window 
and would rather pay a higher fare to switch to a more schedule-convenient path 
located inside or close to their decision window. As a result, simulated revenues 
at the system level increase and this trend is strengthened as the value of the 
replanning disutility increases and passengers are less and less willing to travel 
on schedule-inconvenient paths. This is especially true for business passengers 
that have on average shorter decision windows and higher replanning 
disutilities.  
 
Finally, let us consider how these incremental revenues at the system level 
are split between the two competing airlines. Simulation results show that when 
the variable replanning disutility is relatively low, airline 2 revenues tend to 
increase while airline 1 revenues decrease. However, when the replanning 
disutility is high, we observe higher revenues gains for airline 1 and airline 2 
revenues tend to decrease. Actually, as stated in Chapter 3, despite very similar 
schedules, airline 1 has a small schedule advantage over airline 2 due to the 
geographical location of its hub relative to the bulk of traffic flows in Network D. 
When the variable replanning disutility is low, business passengers are more 
willing to switch to airline 2: Since airline 2 offers slightly more inconvenient 
schedules with longer travel times in most markets, airline 2 paths might lie 
outside the decision window for some business passengers but relatively close to 
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it. As a result, if the variable disutility is very low for paths close to a passenger 
decision window, some airline 1 passengers might be willing to switch to airline 
2 to take advantage of a lower fare/restriction product, a better path quality or 
probably more frequently to travel on their favorite airline.  
 
However, as the value of passenger preference for schedule increases and 
the variable replanning disutility becomes larger even for paths close to a 
passenger decision window, business passengers are less and less willing to 
switch airlines and prefer to travel on the airline offering the most convenient 
schedule. As a result, revenue gains become higher for airline 1 and revenues 
start to decrease for airline 2. 
 
To summarize, the use of a variable replanning disutility model leads to 
an increase in PODS simulated revenues at the system level but also to a more 
realistic evaluation of the benefits of airline 1 schedule advantage: the variable 
replanning disutility model leads to a decrease in the cost of paths located 
outside but close to a passenger decision window and this benefits airline 2 that 
offers slightly less attractive schedules. 
 
Network E 
 
As shown by the sensitivity analysis of airline revenues with regard to the 
value of a constant replanning disutility performed in Chapter 4, the impact of 
how passengers value preference for schedule on airline revenues is much 
greater in schedule-asymmetric network E than in schedule-symmetric network 
D. Similarly, the magnitude of the change in revenues is much greater in 
network E than in network D when a variable replanning disutility is introduced. 
Figures 5.6., 5.7. and 5.8. below show the evolution of airline revenues in 
network E for the three simulation scenarios. 
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Figure 5.6. : % change in simulated airline revenues when business 
passengers only use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 1) 
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Figure 5.7. : % change in simulated airline revenues when leisure passengers 
only use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 2) 
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Figure 5.8. : % change in simulated airline revenues when both business and 
leisure passengers use a variable replanning disutility (Scenario 3) 
 
As in Network D, the introduction of a variable replanning disutility has a 
greater impact for business than for leisure passengers. When the variable 
replanning disutility is used for both types of passengers, the change in airline 
revenues comes primarily from business passengers. 
 
In addition, like in Network D, revenues at the system level tend to 
increase for all scenarios and all values of the replanning disutilities. However, 
this increase is more moderate than in Network D for scenarios 1 and 3 as airline 
1 and 3 do not have sufficient capacity to accommodate all the passenger 
demand that prefer to travel on schedule–convenient paths and a large number 
of passengers are unable to book their most preferred alternative as confirmed by 
the analysis of more detailed revenue data in the next subsection. 
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  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Low 0.02% 0.12% 0.22% 
Medium  0.27% 0.17% 0.45% 
High 0.25% 0.23% 0.56% 
 
Table 5.4. : % change in simulated airline revenues at the system level in 
Network E 
 
Finally, like in the sensitivity analysis of last chapter, the schedule-
dominant airline (airline 1) and its alliance partner (airline 3) benefit from the 
variable replanning disutility approach, especially if the replanning disutility is 
assumed to be relatively high and passengers view preference for schedule as an 
important element in the choice of a travel alternative. A large number of 
passengers, especially business passengers prefer to travel on airline 1 and 3 that 
offer the most attractive schedule. 
 
 On the contrary, revenues of airline 2 that offers a less convenient 
schedule decrease as a variable replanning disutility is introduced, especially for 
the medium and high alternatives and this also affects negatively the revenues of 
its alliance partner, airline 4. For a significant number of passengers, airline 2 
paths are located relatively far from the boundaries of their decision window. For 
these passengers, the value of the replanning disutility increases when the 
variable replanning disutility model is used instead of the constant replanning 
disutility, especially for the medium and high alternatives. These passengers 
consider airline 2 schedules as very unattractive and most of them prefer then to 
travel on airline 1. This explains the large decline in airline 2 revenues when a 
variable replanning disutility is introduced.  
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 As a result, the introduction of a variable replanning disutility leads to a 
more realistic evaluation of the revenue advantage associated with attractive 
schedules as the constant replanning disutility approach tends to under-evaluate 
the cost of paths located far from the passenger decision window, something 
occurring often in Network E due to the difference between the airline schedules.  
 
5.3.2. Load factor and Loads by Fare Class 
 
Let us now examine the impact of the variable replanning disutility model 
on airline load factor and fare class mix (loads by fare class). 
 
Network D 
 
Table 5.5. below compares the load factor for the constant and variable 
replanning disutility models. 
 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Constant 83.73% 83.46% 
Low 83.27% 83.53% 83.13% 83.66% 83.64% 83.75% 
Medium 83.38% 83.60% 83.29% 83.53% 83.43% 83.53% 
High 83.54% 83.51% 83.37% 83.30% 83.54% 83.55% 
 
Table 5.5. : Airline load factor in Network D 
 
As expected, when a low variable replanning disutility is introduced, 
airline 1 load factor tends to decrease and airline 2 load factor tends to increase 
as the variable replanning disutility model reduces the benefit of airline 1 
schedule advantage: More passengers, especially business passengers, now select 
airline 2 as their first choice because the cost associated with paths located 
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outside a passenger decision but close to it has been lowered. However, as 
replanning disutilities become larger and we shift from the low to the medium 
and high alternatives, this effect tends to progressively disappear and airline 1 
load factor increases again. 
 
This trend is confirmed by the analysis of the loads by fare class or fare class mix. 
In Figures 5.9. and 5.10. below, fare classes are grouped in two categories: high-
yield fare classes (Y and B fare classes) that are selected primarily by business 
passengers and low-yield fare classes (M and Q  fare classes) selected primarily 
by leisure passengers. 
 
When a variable replanning disutility is introduced, fare class mix at the 
industry level improves: The number of high-yield passengers increases while 
the number of low yield passengers decreases. This is expected, as with a 
variable replanning disutility, passengers are more willing to purchase higher 
fares in order to travel on a schedule convenient path.  
 
However, the change in fare class mix is not similar for airline 1 and 
airline 2. If the variable replanning disutility is low, fare class mix improves for 
airline 2 and deteriorates for airline 1. With a low replanning disutility, more 
business passengers will choose airline 2 as their first choice due to a lower and 
more accurate valuation of the schedule inconvenience associated with airline 2 
slightly less convenient schedules. But, as the cost of schedule inconvenience 
increases for the medium and high alternatives, convenient schedules become 
more valuable and airline 1 loads in the high-yield classes increase as well. 
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Figure 5.9. : Loads in the high-yield fare classes (Network D, Scenario 1) 
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Figure 5.10. : Loads in the low-yield fare classes (Network D, Scenario 1) 
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Network E 
 
Table 5.6. below shows that the change in load factor is influenced by the 
schedule asymmetry of Network E. Unlike in network D, airline 1 load factor 
does not decrease when a variable replanning disutility is introduced but 
increases very substantially, especially for scenarios 1 and 3. When a variable 
replanning disutility is used, the paths offered by airline 2 that lie far outside the 
decision window for a significant number of passengers appear very unattractive 
and more passengers prefer to travel on airline 1. This is especially true for 
business passengers that consider schedule convenience as a very important 
criterion in the choice of a path and have both shorter decision windows and 
higher replanning disutilities. 
 
 Airline 1 Airline 2 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Constant 78.08% 82.15% 
Low 78.84% 78.33% 78.53% 81.74% 81.52% 81.49% 
Medium 80.10% 78.01% 79.51% 80.35% 81.98% 80.56% 
High 80.12% 77.78% 78.40% 80.33% 80.55% 80.20% 
 
Table 5.6. : Airline load factor in Network E 
 
The effect of schedule asymmetry is confirmed by the analysis of the fare 
class mix. In Network E, high-yield loads increase substantially for Alliance A 
partners as business passengers try to take advantage of convenient flight 
schedules. However, as airline 1 and 3 are unable to accommodate all of the 
demand, they spill low-yield passengers to their competitors and the number of 
low-yield passengers increases for airline 2 and 4 as shown in Figures 5.11 and 
5.12. below. 
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Figure 5.11. : Loads in the high-yield fare classes (Network E, Scenario 1) 
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Figure 5.12. : Loads in the low-yield fare classes (Network E, Scenario 1) 
 118
5.3.2. Revenues per Category 
 
Finally, to confirm our analysis so far, let us now look at more detailed 
revenue data, revenues by category in Network D and E. Since we established in 
the previous section that most of the change in airline revenues was associated 
with the introduction of a variable replanning disutility for business passengers, 
we will present in this section simulation results when only business passengers 
use a variable replanning disutility (scenario 1). Results for the other two 
scenarios are largely similar. For all graphs in this section, the base case is 
revenues with a constant replanning disutility for both business and leisure 
passengers. 
 
Network D 
 
Figures 5.13. to 5.16. show the change in first choice, sell-up, recapture and 
spill-in revenues for both airlines. For a definition of these revenue categories, 
the reader is referred to Chapter 4. 
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Figure 5.13. : Change in first choice revenues (Network D) 
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Figure 5.14. : Change in sell-up revenues (Network D) 
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Figure 5.15. : Change in recapture revenues (Network D) 
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Figure 5.16. : Change in spill-in revenues (Network D) 
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Let us first consider sell-up revenues, i.e. revenues from passengers 
switching to a higher fare class on the same flight itinerary. As expected, sell-up 
revenues increase as business passengers are more willing to switch to a higher 
fare class to travel on a schedule-convenient path and are not willing to accept to 
shift to a path that is located far from their decision window due to its level of 
schedule inconvenience. Also, as expected, sell-up revenues are higher for the 
medium and high alternatives for both airlines. As the value of schedule 
convenience increases, business passengers are more and more reluctant to shift 
to alternative paths and are more willing to accept to sell-up to a more expensive 
fare class in order to travel on a schedule-convenient path. 
 
In addition to sell-up revenues, recapture revenues also increase when a 
variable replanning disutility is introduced. While this may seem counter-
intuitive, it is the result of two opposite effects. With a variable replanning 
disutility, business passengers are more reluctant to shift to alternative paths 
offered by the same airline located far outside their decision window. However, 
they are also more willing than before to shift to an alternative path that is 
located close to their decision window. When a variable replanning disutility is 
introduced, the second effect seems to dominate and recapture revenues 
increase. However, as the value of schedule convenience increases, business 
passengers should be less and less willing to shift to paths located outside their 
decision window, even if they are located relatively close to their decision 
window. Indeed, as we shift from the medium to the high valuation of 
replanning disutilities, recapture revenues increase only slightly for airline 1 and 
start to decrease for airline 2. 
 
As is the case with sell-up and recapture revenues, spill-in revenues also 
tend to increase when business passengers use a variable replanning disutility to 
evaluate the schedule convenience of a path located outside their decision 
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window. As outlined in Chapter 4, this is expected since passengers are assumed 
to be more willing to shift to another airline to travel on a schedule-convenient 
path, even if this airline is not their favorite carrier and this trend is also expected 
to increase with the value of schedule convenience as observed.  
 
Finally, let us analyze the evolution of first choice revenues. Since 
business passengers are more willing shift to a higher fare class on the same 
path, alternative paths located close to their decision window or to the 
competitor airline, the supply of seats is constrained by the aircraft capacity and 
the load factor is relatively high (83%), this means that the proportion of business 
passengers that get their first choice satisfied will decrease and first choice 
revenues will be negatively impacted for both airlines. Table 5.7. below shows 
data for the proportion of passengers that had their first choice satisfied by 
airline and fare class:  
 
  Fare Class Constant Low Medium High 
Y 0.909 0.904 0.898 0.896 
B 0.916 0.907 0.886 0.879 
M 0.875 0.857 0.817 0.81 
AL 1 
  
  
  Q 0.724 0.665 0.632 0.619 
Y 0.91 0.903 0.896 0.895 
B 0.915 0.903 0.875 0.87 
M 0.848 0.809 0.756 0.745 
AL 2 
  
  
  Q 0.733 0.657 0.629 0.629 
 
Table 5.7. : Proportion of passengers that had their first choice satisfied  
 
For all fare classes and both airlines, the proportion of passengers that had 
their first choice satisfied decreases as a variable replanning disutility is 
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introduced and the value of schedule convenience increases. As a result, this 
leads to a decrease in first choice revenues for both airlines.  
 
However, the decrease in first choice revenues is larger for airline 1 than 
for airline 2, especially for the low replanning disutility case. As mentioned 
earlier, airline 1 has a small schedule advantage over airline 2 due to the 
geographical location of its hub relative to the bulk of traffic flows in Network D. 
As a result, some business passengers may have in their decision window only 
an airline 1 path. However, for these passengers, there is probably an airline 2 
path that does not fit within their decision window but is located very close to it. 
If a constant replanning disutility is added to the cost of all paths located outside 
a passenger decision window, PODS will over-estimate the cost of the airline 2 
path and an airline 1 path will be the passenger’s first choice, even if airline 2 is 
his favorite airline. However, if we use a variable replanning disutility and this 
disutility is assumed to be relatively low, the same passenger may now choose 
the airline 2 path as his first choice, especially if this path has a better 
fare/restriction combination, a better path quality or more frequently if airline 2 
is the passenger’s favorite airline. As a result, if we introduce a variable 
replanning disutility, more passengers will have airline 2 as their first choice and 
first choice revenues will decrease less for airline 2 than for airline 1, especially if 
the value of the variable replanning disutility is relatively low. 
 
Network E 
 
Figures 5.17. to 5.20. show the change in revenues for each airline by 
category in Network E when a variable replanning disutility is introduced for 
business passengers only. 
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Figure 5.17. : Change in first choice revenues (Network E) 
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Figure 5.18. : Change in sell-up revenues (Network E) 
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Figure 5.19. : Change in recapture revenues (Network E) 
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Figure 5.20. : Change in spill-in revenues (Network E) 
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Like in Network D, sell-up revenues increase for all airlines as business 
passengers are more willing to switch to a higher fare class in order to travel on a 
schedule-convenient path. With a variable replanning disutility, they prefer to 
pay a higher fare than travel on a schedule-inconvenient path located far outside 
their decision window. However, sell-up revenues also reflect the asymmetry 
between airlines in Network E. Sell-up revenues increase far more for the 
schedule-dominant airline 1 than for its weaker competitor airline 2. In addition, 
as schedule convenience becomes a more important criterion in passenger choice, 
the schedule disadvantage penalizes airline 2 even more and sell-up revenues are 
lower for airline 2 for the medium and high than for the low alternative. Finally, 
for airline 3 and 4, the change in sell-up revenues depends on their alliance 
partner and sell-up revenues increase more for airline 3 than for airline 4. 
 
Also like in Network D, recapture revenues increase when a variable 
replanning disutility is introduced. As explained above, this increase is the result 
of two opposite effects. With a variable replanning disutility, business 
passengers may be more or less reluctant to shift to alternative paths depending 
on the location of the path relative to their decision window. The increase in 
recapture revenues suggests that for most business passengers, the location of 
alternative paths offered by the same airline is generally relatively close to their 
decision window. However, like for the sell-up category, the change in recapture 
revenues also reflect the structure of Network E and its schedule asymmetry 
between airline 1 and airline 2: Recapture revenues increase more for airline 1 
thanks to its schedule attractiveness and this also influences positively recapture 
revenues of its European partner. 
 
However, the influence of schedule asymmetry in Network E is the largest 
on the following two categories: first choice and spill-in revenues. Due to the 
attractiveness of its schedule relative to its competitor, airline 1 is much more 
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attractive to a large number of passengers. A large proportion of business 
passengers consider it as their first choice and the introduction of a variable 
replanning disutility tends to strengthen that trend. As a result, unlike in 
Network D, airline 1 first choice revenues increase slightly, especially for the 
medium and high alternatives. On the other hand, as passenger preference for 
schedule increases under the variable replanning disutility scheme, airline 2 
seems less and less attractive and airline 2 first choice revenues decrease sharply, 
especially for the medium and high alternatives. For airline 3 and 4, the change 
in first choice revenues is once again influenced by the evolution of their US 
partner and they increase slightly for airline 3 and decrease for airline 4 but less 
than for airline 2. 
 
Faced with a very high demand, airline 1 does not have enough space to 
accommodate all passengers and is unable to satisfy their first choice 
requirements for a significant number of them. Some get recaptured and this 
explains the high level of airline 1 recapture revenues. Others switch to its 
weaker competitor and this is reflected in the high level of airline 2 spill-in 
revenues. In addition, the use of a variable replanning disutility tends to 
strengthen these trends compared to the constant replanning disutility approach. 
This explains the sharp increase in airline 1 recapture and airline 2 spill-in 
revenues, especially for the medium and high alternatives. 
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5.4. Summary 
 
 
In this chapter, we have analyzed the impact of introducing a variable 
replanning disutility in both a schedule-symmetric and schedule-asymmetric 
environment. The analysis of the revenue performance at the industry, airline 
and category levels reveals that the impact of how passenger preference for 
schedule is modeled in PODS can be very significant and depends largely on the 
structure of the network environment.  
 
In the next chapter, we will synthesize all the results and the lessons 
learned during this research and we will develop further research directions on 
passenger preference for schedule and traveler choice in the airline industry. 
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Chapter 6  Conclusion 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the objective of this thesis was to 
review the PODS Passenger Choice Model and evaluate the relevance of its 
assumptions relative to the current state of the airline industry, to the issues 
studied by the PODS consortium and the recent advancements in consumer 
choice theory. In addition, as the development of a transatlantic alliance network 
was associated with the introduction of schedule asymmetry in PODS, we have 
focused as a case study on one particular component of the PODS passenger 
choice model, passenger preference for a flight schedule. 
 
 
6.1. Summary of Findings and Contributions 
 
 In the first part of this thesis, we have described the current PODS 
Passenger Choice Model and compared its assumptions to the models found in 
the consumer choice literature. We have established in Chapter 3 that the PODS 
generalized cost function can be compared to the specification of a mixed logit 
model with normally distributed independent random coefficients. As a result, 
the PODS Passenger Choice Model can be approximated by a series of mixed 
logit models, one for each market and passenger type (964 market-types in 
Network D). Based on data collected on actual passenger choice or through 
surveys simulating a booking process, it would then be possible to estimate the 
coefficients of the PODS generalized cost function, i.e. their mean and standard 
deviation using available estimation techniques. 
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In the second part of this thesis, we have focused on how passenger 
preference for schedule is modeled in PODS and its impact of the revenue 
performance of competing airlines both in a schedule-symmetric and schedule-
asymmetric environment. We have established that the constant replanning 
disutility model used in PODS was not relevant to study the impact of schedule 
asymmetry because it tends to under-estimate or over-estimate the value of a 
path class depending on its location relative to the passenger decision window. 
As a result, we have developed an alternative model called the variable 
replanning disutility model that determines the value of the replanning disutility 
based on the deviation of each path from the passenger decision function. Based 
on a review of the literature, we have proposed to use a piece-wise linear 
function to calculate the replanning disutility of each path based on its offset 
from the nearest boundary of the passenger decision window. 
 
We have then used the simulator to evaluate the impact of the variable 
replanning disutility model in both a schedule-symmetric and schedule-
asymmetric network environment. From the results of the simulation study, we 
can draw the four following conclusions.  
 
First, the variable replanning disutility model has a larger impact in PODS 
on business than on leisure passengers. This was expected since business 
travelers are generally assumed in the industry to be more sensitive to non-
monetary elements like for instance fare class restrictions or schedule than leisure 
passengers that are assumed to be mainly concerned about fares and this 
behavior is incorporated in the PODS Passenger Choice Model. As a result, based 
on the proportion of business passengers in the traveler population in each 
market, one can determine whether the impact of offering a wider schedule 
coverage will be rather large or small. 
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Second, the use of a variable replanning disutility model leads to an 
increase in simulated revenues at the system level. Due to this more realistic 
representation of the schedule convenience of each path, passengers are more 
reluctant to travel on schedule-inconvenient paths located far outside their 
decision window and some of them prefer to pay a higher fare to travel on a 
more schedule-convenient path. As a result, simulated industry revenues in 
general and sell-up revenues in particular increase. 
 
Third, the impact of the variable replanning disutility model is much 
larger in a schedule-asymmetric than in a schedule-symmetric environment. 
PODS simulation results show that the revenue advantage of offering a better 
schedule can be very significant, something that was largely under-estimated 
when the constant replanning disutility model is used. As a result, PODS could 
be used to estimate the potential revenue benefits of offering improved schedules 
or the potential revenue losses incurred when an airline decides to cut its 
schedule coverage at the market and network levels. 
 
Finally, the detailed analysis of the simulation results suggests that the 
introduction of the variable replanning disutility model establishes a better 
balance between the different components of the PODS generalized cost 
function. For instance, with the variable replanning disutility model, some 
passengers are more willing to accept a flight schedule outside but close to their 
decision window in order to travel on their most preferred airline.  
 
To conclude, simulation results suggest that the introduction of the 
variable replanning disutility model is a significant enhancement of the PODS 
simulator:  This more realistic representation of the value of the schedule 
convenience of each path allows using PODS to study with more accuracy 
scheduling issues that are relevant to the current industry environment like for 
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instance the impact on revenues of schedule reductions large network carriers 
have been implementing in the recent months. 
 
6.2. Future Research Directions 
 
From this study of airline passenger choice and this review of the PODS 
Passenger Choice Model, two categories of future research directions could be 
explored.  
 
First, one could investigate further the passenger preference for schedule 
issue. In particular, data collection of actual passenger choice behavior or surveys 
based on the simulation of a booking process involving the choice among several 
alternative flight schedules could enable researchers to calibrate the variable 
replanning disutility function and determine whether to use a function close to 
one of the three alternatives proposed in this thesis.  
 
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to study the relative impact of 
the variable replanning disutility model on various revenue management 
methods routinely used in PODS and in the airline industry. Such a study would 
enable to determine whether sophisticated revenue management techniques can 
be useful to leverage the benefits of offering a better schedule or mitigate the 
revenue losses associated with a less attractive schedule. 
 
In addition to improving the schedule component of the PODS Passenger 
Choice Model, further research could be useful on other parts of the choice 
model prior to starting significant research and simulation work on some issues 
involving specific parts of the passenger choice model. For instance, in order to 
simulate the competition between a network airline in PODS and a low-cost 
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competitor, it might be interesting to review how fare class restrictions are 
modeled in PODS and if the assumptions used in the simulator are a realistic 
representation of the current state of the industry. Furthermore, besides 
preference for schedule, it might be relevant to investigate some elements of the 
model related to the strengths of network carriers like for instance passenger 
loyalty and frequent flyer programs modeled in PODS through the unfavorite 
airline disutility. 
 
Finally on a more extended scale, extensive data collection on passenger 
booking choice behavior would enable to use advanced estimation techniques to 
determine the value of the coefficients of the PODS generalized cost function 
based on the specification of a mixed logit model with independent, normally 
distributed random coefficients or any other mixed logit specification. 
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